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1. Introduction 
Currently, the scope of tax transparency is increasing on a global level. Taxpayers and third 
parties have to provide more information to both tax authorities and the general public. An 
increasing scope of transparency in international taxation had already been advocated for a 
long time. In 1998, the Organisation for Economic Development and Co-operation (OECD) 
identified the lack of transparency and the lack of effective exchange of information as key 
characteristics of harmful tax regimes1 and has since then put a focus on increasing 
transparency in international taxation.2 After the Liechtenstein tax affair and the UBS scandal 
in 2007 and 2008 followed by the financial crisis with the bailouts of financial institutions in 
2008, cooperation in tax matters and in particular exchange of information has been highly 
placed on the political agenda of many jurisdictions. Supported by the OECD and the G20 the 
Global Forum has been working on enhancing the scope and effectiveness of exchange of tax-
related information and put political pressure on those jurisdictions that were more reluctant 
to implement a broad-scale automatic exchange of information for tax matters.3 
Subsequently, in 2013, automatic exchange of information has been announced by the G20 
as the new global standard.4 Even though at the beginning the focus was on the exchange of 
financial information as some jurisdictions previously had insisted on strict banking secrecy, 
the work on automatic exchange of information for tax purposes lead to a number of 
measures to increase transparency.  
                                                     
1 OECD (1998), Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue, OECD Publishing, Paris, p. 28 ff. 
2 OECD (2000), Improving Access to Bank Information for Tax Purposes, OECD Publishing, Paris; 
OECD (2001), Towards Global Tax Co-operation: Progress in Identifying and Eliminating Harmful Tax Practices, 
OECD Publishing, Paris; OECD (2002), The OECD's Project on Harmful Tax Practices: The 2001 Progress Report, 
OECD Publishing, Paris; OECD (2003), Improving Access to Bank Information for Tax Purposes: The 2003 Progress 
Report, OECD Publishing, Paris; OECD (2006), Tax Co-operation 2006: Towards a Level Playing Field, OECD 
Publishing, Paris; OECD (2007), Improving Access to Bank Information for Tax Purposes: The 2007 Progress 
Report, OECD Publishing, Paris; OECD (2007), Tax Co-operation 2007: Towards a Level Playing Field, OECD 
Publishing, Paris; OECD (2008), Tax Co-operation 2008: Towards a Level Playing, OECD Publishing, Paris; 
OECD (2009), Tax Co-operation 2009: Towards a Level Playing Field, OECD Publishing, Paris; OECD (2010), Tax Co-
operation 2010: Towards a Level Playing Field, OECD Publishing, Paris; OECD (2010), Implementing the Tax 
Transparency Standards: A Handbook for Assessors and Jurisdictions, OECD Publishing, Paris; 
OECD (2011), Implementing the Tax Transparency Standards: A Handbook for Assessors and Jurisdictions, Second 
Edition, OECD Publishing, Paris; OECD (2012), Keeping It Safe: The OECD Guide on the Protection of Confidentiality 
of Information Exchanged for Tax Purposes, OECD Publishing, Paris; OECD (2014), Countering Harmful Tax 
Practices More Effectively, Taking into Account Transparency and Substance, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
3 See e.g. X. Oberson, International Exchange of Information on Tax Matters, Towards Global Transparency 
(Edward Elgar 2015) p. 8 ff. 
4 See G20 St. Petersburg Summit Communique of September, 2013, available at https://g20.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/12/Saint_Petersburg_Declaration_ENG_0.pdf.  
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Increasing transparency should hamper both tax evasion and tax avoidance. Most countries 
tax the worldwide income of their residents.5 Where the income is not subject to third-party 
reporting, residents usually have to self-assess their worldwide income and report it to the tax 
authorities in their residence state. This requires that the taxpayer reports its tax liabilities “on 
the basis of legal positions that [he] reasonably and in good faith believes to be correct”.6 
Exchange of information and cooperation between tax authorities of different jurisdictions 
should provide the tools to identify taxpayers that are not compliant and commit a criminal 
offence by not disclosing all their worldwide income.7  
Nevertheless, even though there is no obligation to pay more than the amount of tax required 
by the applicable tax laws,8 transparency initiatives seem to also have the aim to hinder tax 
avoidance where a taxpayer tries to legally reduce his tax liabilities.9 Triggered by the media 
reporting about EU state aid cases10 and the revealing of LuxLeaks,11 the Panama papers12 and 
BahamaLeaks13 the voices of tax activist groups demanding for more transparency in tax 
matters became louder as well.14 Multinationals and high-net-worth individuals have been 
accused of not paying their ‘fair share’ of taxes. When paying low or no taxes in certain high-
tax jurisdictions, multinationals are however not always acting illegally but are often exploiting 
gaps and loopholes in domestic and international tax legislation and inter alia also stem from 
                                                     
5 K. Vogel & A. Rust, ‘Introduction’, in E. Reimer & A. Rust (eds.), Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions, 
para. 2. The United States for example however additionally taxes the worldwide income of its citizens. 
6 M. Doran, Tax Penalties and Tax Compliance, 46 Harv. J. on Legis. (2009) p. 111, available at 
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1918&context=facpub, accessed 18 Jan. 
2017.  
7 A. J. Cockfield, Big Data and Tax Haven Secrecy, 18 Florida Tax Review 8 (2016) p. 483 (488). 
8 K. H. Datt, Paying a fair share of tax and aggressive tax planning — A tale of two myths, 12 eJournal of Tax 
Research 2 (2014) p. 410 (415). 
9 A. J. Cockfield, Big Data and Tax Haven Secrecy, 18 Florida Tax Review 8 (2016) p. 489. 
10 European Commission, Commission Decision of 21.10.2015 on State Aid SA.38374 (2014/C ex 2014/NN) 
implemented by the Netherlands to Starbucks, C(2015) 7143 final; European Commission, Commission Decision 
of 21.10.2015 on State Aid SA.38375 (2014/C ex 2014/NN) which Luxembourg granted to Fiat, C(2015) 7152 final; 
European Commission, Commission Decision of 30.8.2016 on State Aid SA.38373 (2014/C) (ex 2014/NN) (ex 
2014/CP) implemented by Ireland to Apple, C(2016) 5605 final. 
11 More information is available at https://www.icij.org/project/luxembourg-leaks, accessed 28 Dec. 2016. 
12 On April 4, 2016, the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists announced their access to the 
“Panama Papers”, 11.5 million documents comprising forty years of emails, bank accounts and client records 
from the Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca. More information is available at 
https://panamapapers.icij.org/, accessed 28 Dec. 2016.  
13 More information is available at https://www.icij.org/blog/2016/09/icij-publishes-leaked-bahamas-info-
offshore-database, accessed 28 Dec. 2016.  
14 See e.g. Tax Justice Network, Tax Us If You Can2 (2012), available at 
http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/TUIYC_2012_FINAL.pdf, accessed 28 Dec. 2016; CONCORD, The Role 
of the EU in ensuring Global Tax Justice (2015), available at 
http://www.actionaid.org/sites/files/actionaid/concord-pcd-tax-ffd-.pdf, accessed 28 Dec. 2016.  
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the fact that the domestic tax systems are different and not always aligned to one another.15 
In order to increase the competitiveness of ‘their MNEs’ or to attract foreign direct 
investment, some jurisdictions intentionally implement tax legislation that leads to double-
non taxation of a part of the MNE’s income or ignore the apparent exploitation of specific 
provisions for aggressive tax planning purposes.16 The perception that some taxpayers are 
getting too easily away with considerably lower effective tax rates has also led to an increasing 
interest in tax issues by the general public. These circumstances and concerns have not only 
resulted in the introduction or strengthening of general and specific anti-avoidance 
provisions17 but also in new tax transparency initiatives that have been or are now being 
implemented globally.  
The OECD’s project against Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) has the aim of addressing 
such tax avoidance strategies that exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules to artificially shift 
profits to low or no-tax locations. The current focus on transparency becomes also apparent 
when looking at the BEPS project18: one of the three key pillars of the Action Plan is “improving 
transparency as well as certainty”.19 Three of the 15 Actions suggest measures to increase 
transparency in international taxation.20 In addition, within the last ten years, even before the 
start of the BEPS project, the scope of exchange of information has been broadened 
considerably.  
In the area of transfer pricing, the documentation requirements continue to evolve and 
extend. Whereas the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines of 2010 stated only some general 
                                                     
15 See also M. T. Evers, I. Meier & C. Spengel, Transparency in Financial Reporting: Is Country-by-Country 
Reporting Suitable to Combat International Profit Shifting?, 1 February 2014, ZEW - Centre for European 
Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 14-015, p. 1, available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2394035 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2394035, accessed 29 Dec. 2016. 
16 See e.g. on the US practices A. Ting, iTax—Apple’s International Tax Structure and the Double Non-Taxation 
Issue, BTR 1 (2014) p. 56 ff and on Ireland on p. 54. 
17 See e.g. Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting, 24 Nov. 2016; Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 laying down rules against tax avoidance 
practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market (Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive, ATAD) (OJ 
2016, L 193/1). 
18 OECD (2013), Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
19 OECD (2015), Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, Action 1 - 2015 Final Report, OECD 
Publishing, Paris, p. 3. 
20 OECD (2015), Countering Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking into Account Transparency and 
Substance, Action 5 - 2015 Final Report, OECD Publishing, Paris; OECD (2015), Mandatory Disclosure Rules, Action 
12 - 2015 Final Report, OECD Publishing, Paris; OECD (2015), Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-
Country Reporting, Action 13 - 2015 Final Report, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
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guidelines,21 the EU recommended already in 2006 transfer pricing documentation 
requirements in its Code of Conduct on Transfer Pricing Documentation for Associated 
Enterprises in the European Union (EU TPD).22 The two-tier system in the EU TPD consists of a 
local file and a master file. This concept is also being used in BEPS Action 13 where an extended 
three-layered TP documentation, consisting of a master file, a local file and a Country-by-
Country Report (CbCR) has been introduced which replaces the existing provisions of Chapter 
V of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (OECD Guidelines).23 The OECD advocates a 
framework where the tax administrations receive CbCR under the provisions for automatic 
exchange of information. Therefore, usually only the tax administrations – and not also the 
public – will have access to the data. Non-profit organizations have however demanded more 
transparency that would also allow the public to have access to the CbCR.24 Increasing 
obligations to disclose tax-related information to the public such as public CbCR have already 
been implemented by some jurisdictions domestically and are currently also discussed within 
the EU.25  
In addition, in the area of exchange of information, the international standard has developed 
within the last decade from exchange of information on request to automatic exchange of 
information for more and more types of income. Automatic exchange of financial information 
has been suggested under the Common Reporting Standard26 and is currently being 
implemented on a global basis. Furthermore, mandatory spontaneous exchange of tax rulings 
is part of BEPS Action 5.27 As a part of the minimum standard, the signatories of the BEPS 
                                                     
21 OECD (2010), OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations 2010, 
OECD Publishing.  
22 Resolution of the Council and of the representatives of the governments of the Member States, meeting within 
the Council, of 27 June 2006 on a code of conduct on transfer pricing documentation for associated enterprises 
in the European Union, 2006/C 176/01. 
23 OECD (2015), Action 13 - 2015 Final Report. 
24 See e.g. Eurodad, Exposing the lost billions. How financial transparency by multinationals on a country-by-country basis 
can aid development (2011), available at http://eurodad.org/files/pdf/4720-exposing-the-lost-billions-how-financial-
transparency-by-multinationals-on-a-country-by-country-basis-can-aid-development-.pdf, accessed 28 Dec. 2016; 
Richard Murphy and the Tax Justice Network, Country-by-Country Reporting: Accounting for globalisation locally 
(2012), available at http://www.taxresearch.org.uk/Documents/CBC2012.pdf, accessed 28 Dec. 2016. 
25 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of income tax information by certain undertakings and branches 
(Proposal for an Amendment of the Accounting Directive), COM/2016/198 final, 12 April 2016. 
26 OECD (2014), Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters, OECD 
Publishing, Paris. 
27 OECD (2015),  Action 5 - 2015 Final Report. 
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Action Plan have committed to implement a standardized and regular exchange of 
information on tax rulings and APAs.28  
Another transparency initiative suggested in the BEPS Action Plan is the adoption of 
Mandatory Disclosure Rules (MDRs).29 In contrast to the other measures mentioned, MDRs 
should be implemented on a purely domestic basis only and would require the taxpayers 
and/or their tax advisors to disclose certain tax planning schemes to the tax authorities. As 
this proposal is not part of the minimum standard that all OECD and G20 countries have 
committed to implement but is just a recommendation, it remains to be seen how many 
jurisdictions will introduce such MDRs.  
The support for some transparency initiatives has a broad basis. The OECD's Global Forum on 
Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, an international body with the 
task to ensure the implementation of the internationally agreed standards of transparency 
and exchange of information in the tax area, has already 147 member countries.30 By 
conducting peer reviews where not only the members of the Global Forum but also countries 
that have not joined the Global Forum are evaluated in respect to the level of implementation 
of transparency initiatives, secrecy jurisdictions should be discouraged and a level playing field 
should be established. Besides the OECD and its Global Forum also the G20 supports 
transparency in international taxation. The G20 has stressed at the G20 summit 2016 in 
Hangzhou, China, that they will continue to support international tax cooperation and in 
particular an effective and widespread implementation of the internationally agreed 
standards on tax transparency.31 Furthermore, the United Nations Committee of Experts on 
International Cooperation in Tax Matters, a 25-member subsidiary body of the Economic and 
Social Council, has a UN code of conduct on cooperation in combating international tax 
evasion on its agenda.32 
                                                     
28 See OECD, OECD releases peer review documents for assessment of BEPS minimum standards (Actions 5 and 
13), 1 Feb. 2017, available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/oecd-releases-peer-review-documents-for-
assessment-of-beps-minimum-standards-actions-5-and-13.htm.  
29 OECD (2015), Action 12 - 2015 Final Report. 
30 More information on the Global Forum and its work is available at 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/about-the-global-forum/, accessed 18 Nov. 2017. 
31 G20, G20 Leaders' Communique Hangzhou Summit, 4-5 September 2016, para. 19, available at 
http://www.g20chn.com/xwzxEnglish/sum_ann/201609/t20160906_3397.html, accessed 28 Dec. 2016. 
32 United Nations Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters, Report on the fifth session 
(19-23 October 2009), E/2009/45 (SUPP) E/C.18/2009/6 (SUPP), paras 48 et seq. and Annex I; A. Binder, L. Turcan 
& V. Wöhrer, The United Nations’ Recent Work in International Taxation, 81 Tax Notes Intl. 7 (2016) p. 612. 
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The tax transparency initiatives should contribute to providing tax administrations with useful 
information for assessing tax risks and specifically targeting those issues in an audit.33 Greater 
transparency does however not only contribute to the combat against tax avoidance and tax 
evasion but also involves an increased degree of data gathering, reporting and information 
exchange either from taxpayers to tax authorities or between tax authorities. This is a 
challenge for both the tax administrations and the taxpayers as they have to cope with 
handling an ever increasing amount of data. Focusing on the proposals in BEPS Action 13, this 
contribution aims to assess the possible advantages and disadvantages that come with the 
increasing data traffic for tax purposes. In addition, the benefits arising from greater 
transparency will be assessed so that the costs and benefits can be compared with one 
another. In order to supplement the existing literature, interviews have been conducted with 
a number of tax experts in Singapore.  
This contribution begins with a detailed analysis of the documentation requirements under 
BEPS Action 13. This part explores the master file, the local file, the CbCR and the proposal for 
public CbCR in the EU. Except for public CbCR, this contribution shall not deal with the 
implementation of the BEPS measures within the EU or in specific countries. Instead, it will 
focus only on the BEPS proposals. The technical analysis of the transparency initiatives will 
serve as the basis for the critical evaluation of the practical consequences. The analysis of the 
documentation and reporting requirements is followed by an evaluation of the costs and 
benefits from a taxpayer’s perspective. It explores the benefit of a greater harmonization of 
documentation requirements as well as the compliance costs, the reputational risks, the risk 
of more disputes and the risk of disclosure of confidential information that could arise from 
transparency initiatives. Subsequently, the costs and benefits are evaluated from a 
government’s perspective. This part discusses the benefits of the additional data available to 
the tax administrations, the deterrent effect of increasing transparency on tax planning of 
MNEs and the possible positive changes to the tax landscape due to the increasing information 
that will be available to the tax administrations and – under the proposed public CbCR – 
possibly also to the general public. Furthermore, the costs of implementing the system for a 
broad-scope automatic exchange of information as well as possible implications on the 
competitiveness of a jurisdiction’s tax system will be addressed.  
                                                     
33 OECD (2015), Action 13 - 2015 Final Report, p. 13. 
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2. Selected Transparency Initiatives 
2.1. BEPS Action 13: Master File 
In October 2015, the OECD released the Final Report of Action 13 as part of its BEPS project. 
The OECD put forward a proposal for extended transfer pricing documentation and provided 
a clear template for providing information via a master file, local files and a CbCR.34 One of the 
three components of the new TP documentation concept in BEPS Action 13 is the master file 
which should be prepared by multinational enterprises (MNEs) and be updated on a frequent 
basis. The master file is intended to provide a high-level overview of the MNE group business 
and contains information about the overall MNE group such as its global business operations, 
its general transfer pricing policies, and its global allocation of income and economic activity. 
The master file shall “assist tax administrations in evaluating the presence of significant 
transfer pricing risk” by placing “the MNE group’s transfer pricing practices in their global 
economic, legal, financial and tax context”.35 
BEPS Action 13 recommends implementing a requirement for MNEs to prepare and file a 
master file domestically. A lot of countries have already implemented this recommendation. 
Other than the CbCR, the master file has to be filed directly to the tax administrations in each 
country where the MNE is doing business. Therefore, for submitting the master file the 
domestically applicable laws in all those countries are relevant.36 BEPS Action 13 recommends 
a set of data that should be included in the master file but leaves the detailed implementation 
mainly to the discretion of the jurisdictions implementing the master file documentation. In 
particular, unlike for the CbCR, no model legislation has been suggested. Furthermore, BEPS 
Action 13 does not suggest a threshold that determines which MNEs would fall under the 
requirement to file a master file. As a consequence, the thresholds for MNE to be covered by 
the obligation to file a master file vary considerably between different jurisdictions.37  
                                                     
34 OECD (2015), Action 13 - 2015 Final Report, p. 22. 
35 OECD (2015), Action 13 - 2015 Final Report, p. 14 f. 
36 OECD (2015), Action 13 - 2015 Final Report, p. 20. 
37 For example in Spain companies with worldwide revenue of EUR 45 million must prepare a master file, while 
in France the threshold is EUR 400 million. In Japan the threshold is EUR 800 million. R. Veldhuizen & L. 
Teneketzis, The OECD Master File: Past and Future, 23 Intl. Transfer Pricing J. 6 (2016), p. 452, Journals IBFD. 
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The proposed master file is not a new concept but is based on the transfer pricing 
documentation requirements in the EU TPD.38 The master file according to the EU TPD 
provides information on transfer pricing policies applied by MNEs for their EU operations. The 
document typically includes an industry analysis, a company background, a functional analysis, 
a selection of methods and economic analyses. The functional analysis describes the functions 
performed, risks assumed and assets used. In addition, a selection of the transfer pricing 
methods and the subsequent economic analyses relevant to multiple members of the MNE 
group in different jurisdictions are included. The master file should essentially explain the 
arm's length nature of the company's transfer prices to the tax authorities.  
Even though the documentation requirements under BEPS Action 13 are based on the EU TPD, 
BEPS Action 13 goes beyond of what is required under the EU TPD as it obliges MNEs to 
provide information in a more “formalistic” and standardized manner.39 The master file 
requires a disclosure of “indicators of where and how an MNE’s business operations are 
conducted globally”.40 In order to achieve that goal, the master file must include information 
on five categories: (1) the company’s organizational structure, (2) a description of the MNE’s 
business(es), (3) the MNE’s intangibles, (4) the MNE’s intercompany financial activities and (5) 
the MNE’s financial and tax positions.  
The part on the company’s organizational structure requires an illustration of the MNE’s legal 
and ownership structure and the geographical location of operating entities. This requirement 
to disclose the legal and ownership structure of the entities of a MNE on a global basis should 
provide the tax authorities with a better understanding of the taxpayer’s business. Whereas 
the legal and ownership structure has to be disclosed, the organization of the company from 
a functional perspective is not required and has to be provided only as far as it is required in 
other parts of the master file.41 
                                                     
38 OECD, Public Consultation, White Paper on Transfer Pricing Documentation, 30 July 2013, p. 21, para. 74; S.T.Y. 
Sim, A Different Take on Transfer Pricing in Asia, 22 Asia-Pac. Tax Bull. 4 (2016), Journals IBFD. 
39 R. Veldhuizen & L. Teneketzis, The OECD Master File: Past and Future, 23 Intl. Transfer Pricing J. 6 (2016), p. 
448, Journals IBFD. 
40 J.S. Wilkie, Master File, Local File and Country-by-Country Reporting: A Canadian Perspective, 23 Intl. Transfer 
Pricing J. 2 (2016), p. 118, Journals IBFD. 
41 R. Veldhuizen & L. Teneketzis, The OECD Master File: Past and Future, 23 Intl. Transfer Pricing J. 6 (2016), p. 
450, Journals IBFD. 
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The part on the description of MNE’s business(es) shall provide a high-level analysis of the 
MNE’s core business on a global scale. This part has to include the important drivers of 
business profit, a description of the supply chain and the main geographic markets for the 
group’s five largest products and/or service offerings by turnover. In addition, information on 
the value chain and the main geographical markets of other products/services that account 
for more than 5% of the group’s turnover has to be included. Under the EU TPD, the supply 
chain is not required. Nevertheless, it has been typically included in the master file.42 The 
value-chain analysis is the key figure in the master file. It should provide the tax authorities 
with a better understanding of the business and allow an assessment on where the residual 
profit will be taxed. The description of the supply chain should give the tax authorities 
information about the functions performed by members of the MNE group in other countries 
in respect of intra-group services and other transactions. This information provides tax 
authorities with a basis to examine whether some of this profit should be allocated to their 
country without just applying formulary apportionment. BEPS Action 13 does not provide 
further guidance on which information has to be provided on the main geographical markets. 
In addition to an overview of regions or countries where largest products and/or services are 
offered, the description could include details such as market revenue, market share, main 
competitors and/or market trends.43  
Similar as under the EU TPD, the master file under BEPS Action 13 has to include also a 
functional analysis. Under the EU TPD, the functional analysis was however quite detailed and 
was the main part of the master file documentation.44 Under BEPS Action 13 this detailed 
functional analysis is moved to the local file. The functional analysis in the master file can be 
brief and should describe only the “principal contributions to value creation by individual 
entities within the group, i.e. key functions performed, important risks assumed, and important 
assets used”. The changes as compared to the previous tax year will be documented in the 
description of important business restructuring transactions, acquisitions and divestitures. 
                                                     
42 R. Veldhuizen & L. Teneketzis, The OECD Master File: Past and Future, 23 Intl. Transfer Pricing J. 6 (2016), p. 
450, Journals IBFD. 
43 R. Veldhuizen & L. Teneketzis, The OECD Master File: Past and Future, 23 Intl. Transfer Pricing J. 6 (2016), p. 
450, Journals IBFD. 
44 R. Veldhuizen & L. Teneketzis, The OECD Master File: Past and Future, 23 Intl. Transfer Pricing J. 6 (2016), p. 
450, Journals IBFD. 
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When comparing the guidelines in BEPS Action 13 with the EU TPD, the importance that has 
been attached to intangibles and intercompany financial activities becomes apparent. 
Whereas the EU TPD just generally requires detailed documentation on all intra-group 
transactions (including transactions relating to intangibles and intercompany financial 
activities), the master file under BEPS Action 13 requires a detailed analysis of transfer pricing 
relevant information on intangibles and intercompany financial activities in two separate 
parts. The requirement to describe other important intra-group service arrangements can still 
be found under the category for the description of the MNE’s business. In this respect it is 
important to note that not all intra-group service arrangements have to be included in the 
master file but only the ones that are “significant” for the business.  
The documentation on intangibles in the master file does not only consist of a list of the MNE’s 
intangibles important for transfer pricing purposes and information about the legal owners 
but also requires MNEs to outline their overall strategy for the development, ownership and 
exploitation of intangibles that are important for transfer pricing purposes. The 
documentation on intangibles in the master file has to also include the location of principal 
R&D facilities and of R&D management. This focus on intangibles is in line with other proposals 
in the BEPS Action Plan. In transfer pricing, intangibles have been identified as an area that is 
particularly involved in tax planning schemes.45 Under the notion of intangibles adopted by 
the OECD, the allocation of profits from intangibles should no longer be limited to merely 
determining the legal ownership of intangibles. Instead, the entitlement to intangible-related 
returns should follow a new concept: the analysis of functions related to the development, 
maintenance, enhancement, protection and exploitation (DEMPE functions) of the 
intangibles.46 For analyzing the DEMPE functions and consequently allocating the profits from 
exploiting the intangibles accordingly, the additional information about the overall strategy 
for the development, ownership and exploitation of intangibles that has to be reported in this 
part is relevant and useful information.  
                                                     
45 OECD (2015), Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation, Actions 8-10 - 2015 Final Reports, OECD 
Publishing, Paris. 
46 OECD (2015),  Actions 8-10 - 2015 Final Reports, p. 73; R. Petruzzi & V. Wöhrer, “Business Profits, Permanent 
Establishments and Associated Enterprises”, in: M. Lang, P. Pistone, A. Rust, J. Schuch, C. Staringer (eds.), The UN 
Model Convention and its Relevance for the Global Tax Treaty Network (Linde 2016), forthcoming. 
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With regard to the MNE’s intercompany financial activities, a description of how the group is 
financed and information on members of the MNE group that provide a central financing 
function for the group has to be provided in addition to the MNE’s general transfer pricing 
policies related to intra-group financing arrangements.47 The description of how the group is 
financed has to include important financing arrangements with unrelated lenders. This 
requirement under the heading of intra-company financial agreements could be relevant 
because BEPS Action 4 identifies BEPS risks in areas where (i) MNEs place high levels of third-
party debt in high-tax countries, (ii) MNE use intra-group loans to generate interest deductions 
in excess of the group’s actual third-party interest expense and (iii) MNEs using financing to 
fund the generation of tax-exempt income.48 Therefore, the information about financing 
arrangements with unrelated lenders could be used by tax authorities to challenge interest 
rate deductibility.49 
The MNE’s financial and tax positions also form part of the master file and must contain a list 
and description of the MNE’s existing unilateral advance pricing agreements (APAs) and other 
tax rulings relating to the allocation of income among countries. In addition, an annual 
consolidated financial statement for the fiscal year concerned must be included if such a 
consolidated statement had already been prepared for other purposes.50  
As compared to the BEPS requirements for the master file, the master file in the EU TPD is 
more flexible as it often merely requires a general description of the relevant issues. In 
contrast, the master file under BEPS Action 13 requires many lists, e.g. of important intra-
group service agreements, of intangibles, of important intra-group agreements related to 
intangibles and of the MNE group’s tax rulings. Regarding the level of detail, BEPS Action 13 
however still provides for some flexibility by stating that “taxpayers should use prudent 
business judgment in determining the appropriate level of detail for the information 
supplied”.51  
                                                     
47 R. Veldhuizen & L. Teneketzis, The OECD Master File: Past and Future, 23 Intl. Transfer Pricing J. 6 (2016), p. 
447 (450), Journals IBFD. 
48 OECD (2015), Limiting Base Erosion Involving Interest Deductions and Other Financial Payments, Action 4 - 2015 
Final Report, p. 11, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
49 R. Veldhuizen & L. Teneketzis, The OECD Master File: Past and Future, 23 Intl. Transfer Pricing J. 6 (2016), p. 
451, Journals IBFD. 
50 OECD (2015), Action 13 - 2015 Final Report, p. 25 f.  
51 OECD (2015), Action 13 - 2015 Final Report, p. 15. 
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2.2. BEPS Action 13: Local File 
The local file supplements the information in the master file and provides more detailed 
information relating to specific intercompany transactions. The local file has the purpose of 
providing relevant information for transfer pricing analysis of transactions between a local 
country affiliate and associated enterprises in other countries which are material in the 
context of the local country’s tax system. Just like the master file, also the local file in BEPS 
Action 13 is based on the provision already found in the EU TPD. However, in some aspects, 
BEPS Action 13 has considerably extended the scope of information that has to be provided.  
The local file has to be prepared separately for each entity and must be provided directly to 
the local tax administration.52 For each country where a MNE is doing business a local file has 
to be prepared that includes information on (1) the local entity, (2) controlled transactions 
and (3) financial information.53 In general, a local file should be prepared for each jurisdiction 
where the MNE has either a subsidiary or a permanent establishment.  
The data that has to be provided in the local file about controlled transactions is more detailed 
as compared to the EU TPD. Essentially, the local file asks for specific information about intra-
group transactions in which a local country affiliate of an MNE has participated, including the 
identity of transaction parties; the terms and context of the transactions; a suitable functional 
analysis; an explanation of the transfer pricing methodology adopted by the taxpayer to 
establish the pricing and related transaction terms; and related financial information. This kind 
of documentation usually would have to be prepared also independent from the requirements 
in BEPS Action 13 as it is similar to the TP documentation that previously already had to be 
prepared for the tax authorities of many countries.54 The local file under BEPS Action 13 
however has to not only describe and explain country-specific controlled transactions and 
provide information about the comparability analysis and the selection of the appropriate 
method but has to also break the analysis of the controlled transactions down to different 
categories and list the information separately for each tax jurisdictions where the foreign 
payor or recipient of an amount of transaction flow is resident. The local file does however 
not have to include detailed information about all controlled transactions, but should 
                                                     
52 OECD (2015), Action 13 - 2015 Final Report, p. 20. 
53 OECD (2015), Action 13 - 2015 Final Report, p. 27. 
54 J.S. Wilkie, Master File, Local File and Country-by-Country Reporting: A Canadian Perspective, 23 Intl. Transfer 
Pricing J. 2 (2016), p. 118, Journals IBFD. 
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concentrate on ‘material controlled transactions’. BEPS Action 13 does not propose a common 
specific materiality threshold, but instead, recommends that jurisdictions should adopt their 
own thresholds which should consider the size and the nature of the local economy, the 
importance of the MNE group in that economy, the size and nature of local operating entities, 
and the overall size and nature of the MNE.55 This limitation aims to provide tax 
administrations with the relevant information without overwhelming the taxpayers with 
documentation requirements.56  
Furthermore, BEPS Action 13 requires inter alia including copies of all material intercompany 
agreements and of existing unilateral and bilateral/multilateral APAs and other tax rulings to 
which the local tax jurisdiction is not a party and which are related to material controlled 
transactions that are analyzed in the local file. What is more is that the local file has to also lay 
down financial information about the local entity: it’s financial statements, how financial data 
has been used in applying the TP method and a schedule of financial data used for 
comparables.  
2.3. BEPS Action 13: Country-by-Country Report 
The aim of BEPS Action 13 was to develop rules that require MNEs to provide “all relevant 
governments with needed information on their global allocation of the income, economic 
activity and taxes paid among countries according to a common template”.57 The CbCR, 
together with the master file and the local file should give all tax authorities a clear view of an 
entity as a whole and the relationship of its various parts.58 The CbCR is supposed to provide 
deeper insight into how a MNE functions as one unitary enterprise in an economic sense and 
how the functions, profits and assets are allocated to the different entities in the MNE.59  
The CbCR shall provide tax administrations of all countries where a MNE is involved in business 
activities information about the global allocation of income and taxes paid and should 
furthermore allow the tax administrations to assess where the economic activities of a MNE 
take place. Both, the master file and the CbCR are supposed to be made available to the tax 
                                                     
55 OECD (2015), Action 13 - 2015 Final Report, p. 17. 
56 OECD (2015), Action 13 - 2015 Final Report, p. 17. 
57 OECD (2015), Action 13 - 2015 Final Report, p. 9. 
58 S. Picciotto, International Taxation and Economic Substance, 70 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 12 (2016), p. 752 (754), Journals 
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authorities of all jurisdictions where the MNE has a subsidiary or a PE. The contents of the 
master file and the CbCR serve however different purposes. Whereas the master file should 
provide the tax authority with information on the MNE as a whole, without specifically 
requiring data on the separate jurisdictions where the MNE operates, the CbCR focuses on 
providing basic information and key figures on every single country. Thereby, the CbCR shall 
make it easier for tax administrations to identify transfer pricing risks and specifically target 
those issues in an audit.60 Other than the master file and the local file which have already been 
part of transfer pricing documentation under the EU TPD, the CbCR is a new instrument. Only 
for industries of extractive industries61 and financial institutions62 some jurisdictions have 
already implemented CbCR to a certain extent earlier.  
In addition to the master file and the local files MNEs with an annual consolidated group 
revenue equal to or exceeding EUR 750 million also have to prepare a CbCR.63 In general, the 
‘ultimate parent entity’ of the MNE has to prepare and file a CbCR with the tax authorities of 
the jurisdiction where the ultimate parent entity of the MNE group is tax resident. Other than 
the master file and the local file, the CbCR does not have to be provided directly to all local 
tax administrations where the MNE is doing business. Instead, only the ultimate parent entity 
or the surrogate parent entity is required to provide a CbCR to the tax administration of its 
residence state. The tax administration of this country should subsequently transmit the CbCR 
on an automatic basis to each jurisdiction where the MNE group has a subsidiary or a PE 
through applicable exchange-of-information provisions.64  
                                                     
60 OECD (2015), Action 13 - 2015 Final Report, p. 9. 
61 See e.g. the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). This is an international standard to which 
countries can sign up voluntarily. See also Congress of the United States of America, Sec. 1504 Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Customer Protection Act (2010). The Dodd-Frank Act requires companies in the extractive 
sector listed in the US to publish payments made to governments on a country-by-country basis. Similar 
requirements apply to EU companies in the extractive and forestry sector under the Directive 2013/34/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial statements, consolidated 
financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings, amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC Text with 
EEA relevance (OJ 2013, L 182/19). 
62 See e.g. Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the 
activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending 
Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC Text with EEA relevance (OJ 2013, L 
176/338). 
63 OECD (2015), Action 13 - 2015 Final Report, p. 21. 
64 OECD (2015), Action 13 - 2015 Final Report, p. 23. 
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To determine the ultimate parent company, consolidation principles apply. Where the MNE is 
required to prepare consolidated financial statements for financial reporting purposes under 
applicable accounting principles or would be so required if equity interests in any of the 
enterprises were traded on a public securities exchange, it also has to prepare a CbCR.65 All 
entities included in the consolidated statement should also be included in the CbCR.66  
Even though the primary reporting obligation is placed on the ultimate parent entity and the 
CbCR generally has to be filed only in the ultimate parent entity’s residence state, there are 
some situations where a CbCR has to be filed in a different jurisdiction. This is the case where 
the ultimate parent entity does not have to file a CbCR in its residence jurisdiction because 
this jurisdiction does not take part in the CbCR framework as agreed on under BEPS Action 13 
and consequently does not implement domestic legislation requiring the reporting of CbCR. 
Furthermore, a secondary reporting obligation arises where the resident state of the ultimate 
parent entity does not automatically exchange the CbCR with the jurisdictions where the MNE 
group is doing business, either because the necessary competent authority agreement is 
missing or due to a systematic failure.67 In these cases a surrogate parent entity can be 
appointed by the MNE group which files the CbCR on behalf of the ultimate parent entity. If 
no such surrogate parent entity is appointed, all entities in the MNE group are supposed to be 
obliged to file a CbCR.68  
The implementation of CbCR involves both domestic legislation requiring the ultimate parent 
of a MNE to file a CbCR and competent authority agreements providing for automatic 
exchange of CbCR between the contracting states.69 BEPS Action 13 offers templates both for 
domestic legislation and for bi- and multilateral competent authority agreements. BEPS Action 
13 requires an implementation of CbCR and its automatic exchange for fiscal years beginning 
on or after 1 January 2016.70  
The CbCR as it is proposed under BEPS Action 13 basically consists of three separate tables. In 
the first table, all tax jurisdictions where the MNE operates have to be listed and certain 
                                                     
65 OECD (2015), Action 13 - 2015 Final Report, p. 39. 
66 OECD (2016), Guidance on the Implementation of Country-by-Country Reporting – BEPS Action 13, OECD/G20 
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67 OECD (2015), Action 13 - 2015 Final Report, p. 41. 
68 Art. 2 Model CbCR legislation, OECD (2015), Action 13 - 2015 Final Report, p. 40; Section 2 Annex 3 DAC. 
69 OECD (2015), Action 13 - 2015 Final Report, p. 23. 
70 OECD (2015), Action 13 - 2015 Final Report, p. 10. 
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information has to be provided separately for each jurisdiction. In this table, the revenues 
from intra-group transactions and from transactions with independent parties as well as the 
sum thereof, the profit or loss before income tax, the income tax paid, the income tax accrued, 
the stated capital, the accumulated earnings, the number of employees and the value of all 
tangible assets other than cash have to be stated.71 The information relating to PEs has to be 
allocated to the jurisdiction where the PE is situated. BEPS Action 13 allows for flexibility as 
regards the source of the required data. The MNE can choose whether to use data from its 
consolidation reporting packages, from separate entity statutory financial statements, 
regulatory financial statements, or internal management accounts. A reconciliation of the 
revenue, profit and tax reporting in CbCR to the consolidated financial statements is not 
required. The MNE should however use the same source every year.72  
In the second table, a list of all entities and permanent establishments (PEs) and their place of 
organization or incorporation (if it is different from their residence) has to be drawn up. An 
overview of all operating entities has to be included already in the master file. The chart in the 
master file focuses, however, on the legal and ownership structure of the MNE and does not 
have to list the PEs. The table that has to be part of the CbCR, has to disclose the main business 
activity(ies) of each entity and each PE. It can be chosen from ‘Research and Development’, 
‘Holding or Managing Intellectual Property’, ‘Purchasing or Procurement’, ‘Manufacturing or 
Production’, ‘Sales, Marketing or Distribution’, ‘Administrative, Management or Support 
Service’, ‘Provision of Services to Unrelated Parties’, ‘Internal Group Finance’, ‘Regulated 
Financial Services’, ‘Insurance’, ‘Holding Shares or Other Equity instruments’, ‘Dormant’ and 
‘Other’.73  
The third table provides the MNE with some space to provide further information or 
explanation of the data in the CbCR. The MNE for example has to provide information on the 
business activities of those entities where ‘Other’ has been chosen as business activity. In 
addition, the MNE could also provide information on tax transparent partnerships. If a 
partnership is not tax resident in any jurisdiction, its income should be reported as stateless 
income to the extent it is not attributable to a PE. In such a situation, the third table could 
include information on the partnership structure and on whether the stateless income is 
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taxable in a partner jurisdiction.74 Furthermore, the information on the data source and 
explanations of possible deviation between the master file, the local file and the CbCR could 
be provided in this table.75  
2.4. Public Country-by-Country Report 
Even though OECD BEPS Action 13 only proposes automatic exchange of CbCR between the 
tax administrations of the participating member states, recent developments indicate that 
CbCR might not stay confidential but, instead, could eventually become available to the public. 
Already during the drafting of BEPS Action 13, some non-profit organizations have been 
demanding public CbCR.76 The OECD working group responsible for drafting BEPS Action 13 
has however rejected public CbCR.77 Nevertheless, there are ongoing discussions, especially 
within the EU about going beyond the BEPS proposals by requiring MNEs not only to provide 
CbCR to the tax administration but to also make the CbCR available to the public. In addition 
to sharing CbCR between tax authorities, the European Commission has proposed an 
amendment to the Accounting Directive which would require public disclosure of key 
information by large multinationals. 78 This proposal had been discussed by the Working Party 
on Company Law during the Netherlands and Slovak Presidencies. In December 2016, the 
Presidency has presented a compromise proposal which is still under general scrutiny 
reservation of all delegations and under parliamentary scrutiny reservation of Denmark, 
France, Lithuania, Sweden and the UK.79 In February 2017, the European Parliament 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs has however published a draft report 
presenting a more comprehensive version for mandatory public country-by-country reporting 
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for multinational groups.80 On 21 June 2017, the Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs and the Committee on Legal Affairs published a joint report suggesting improvements 
of the Commission’s proposal, in particular a broadening of the scope of public CbCR.81 The 
amended proposal was approved by the European Parliament in first reading.82 It remains to 
be seen whether the Council approves this proposal.  
The proposal for public CbCR has been criticized by the OECD and other jurisdictions as the EU 
representatives were involved in drafting BEPS Action 13 and have supported the decision for 
automatic exchange of CbCR as the new framework. Pascal Saint-Amans, director of the 
OECD's Centre for Tax Policy and Administration argued that public CbCR was “not the deal 
that was reached” by the OECD and G-20.83 Similarly, Robert Stack from the US Treasury 
expressed his concerns about the EU proposal to make CbCR public: “The Treasury department 
was most disappointed when the EU member states agreed in the BEPS Project to country-by-
country reporting among tax authorities and then proposed to make it public. The ink wasn’t 
dry on the BEPS recommendations before certain elements at the EU proposed walking away 
from the multinational agreement to suggest that this should be done on a public basis.“84 
Public CbCR is however not a completely new concept. Certain sectors are already obliged to 
disclose a CbCR to the public. Within the EU, companies in the extractive and forestry sectors 
already have to disclose payments to governments on a CbC-basis as part of their annual 
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financial statements.85 Furthermore, banks and investment funds are obliged to prepare a 
CbCR and to publish it together with their annual report.86 Public CbCR for banking groups is 
however different from the recently proposed public CbCR for MNE of all branches and 
requires only a more limited set of information. Credit institutions and investment firms have 
to annually disclose the name and nature of activities undertaken by an entity, their turnover, 
number of full time employees, profit or loss before tax, tax on profit or loss, and any public 
subsidies received. The data has to be provided aggregated by country and by institution.  
Whereas the already existing EU requirements for the extractive sector only require the 
disclosure of payments to governments, the provision for the banking sector as well as the 
recently proposed amendment of the Accounting Directive to implement CbCR in the EU 
require the publication of the taxes due and taxes paid of a multinational as well as some key 
economic indicators. The scope of the set of data that has to be disclosed is however more 
limited than the data that has to be reported under BEPS Action 13.  
If the proposal to amend the Accounting Directive is successful public CbCR would have to be 
implemented in all member states of the EU. All MNEs with their headquarter, a subsidiary or 
a PE in the EU that do not operate in only one tax jurisdiction87 would be required to publish 
a CbCR with a business register in the EU and online on their company website for at least five 
consecutive years.88 In general, the ultimate parent entity will be obliged to publish the CbCR 
if it is governed by the national laws of one of the EU member states. Public CbCR does not 
only cover MNEs headquartered in the EU, but also MNEs based outside the EU. In such a case, 
the subsidiary will be required to publish a CbCR. If the subsidiary does not have the necessary 
information for preparing the CbCR available and cannot obtain all required information it has 
to explain why this is the case. Furthermore, a CbCR containing information to the extent that 
the data is available to the subsidiary has to be published. Similar reporting requirements 
apply to EU branches of undertakings not governed by the law of one of the EU member 
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states.89 Credit institutions and investment firms will be exempt from the CbCR under the 
amendment of the Accounting Directive because they have to publish a CbCR under the EU 
Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV)90.  
Under the Commission’s proposal, the turnover threshold for public CbCR is the same as for 
CbCR to national tax authorities. The proposed changes to the Accounting Directive are 
addressed to MNEs with an annual consolidated net turnover exceeding EUR 750 million.91 In 
contrast, the draft report of the European Parliament Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs suggest using existing definitions of large undertakings and large groups in the 
Accounting Directive. As a result, the threshold requirements under the Parliament’s proposal 
are already fulfilled if an undertaking or a group on a consolidated basis exceeds at least two 
of three criteria: a balance sheet total of EUR 20 million, a net turnover of EUR 40 million and 
an average number of employees during the financial year of 250.92 If this lower threshold 
would become applicable, a substantially higher number of MNE would be affected.93  
According the Commission’s proposal, the CbC report has to disclose information on the 
nature of the activities, the number of employees, the total net turnover, profit or loss before 
income tax, the amount of income tax accrued in the relevant year, the amount of income tax 
paid during the relevant year, and accumulated earnings. The proposal approved by the 
European Parliament in first reading requires in addition that also the other elements of a CbC 
report under the DAC are included: the name of the ultimate undertaking and, where 
applicable, a list of all its subsidiaries, the fixed assets other than cash or cash equivalents, the 
stated capital and the net turnover separately for the turnover made with related parties and 
the turnover made with unrelated parties. Furthermore, the European Parliament’s proposal 
would even extent the scope of public CbC reporting beyond the reporting requirements 
under BEPS Action 13. It would require to report also details of public subsidies received and 
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donations made to politicians, political organisations or political foundations and whether 
undertakings, subsidiaries or branches benefit from preferential tax treatment, from a patent 
box or equivalent regimes.  
The European Commission proposed that the information in the CbC report shoud be stated 
separately for each EU member state. In this context, the data relating to PEs has to be 
allocated to the jurisdiction where the PE is situated. Information on activities outside the EU 
would have to be provided on an aggregated basis for other tax jurisdictions. Only for certain 
jurisdictions listed in a common EU list of non-compliant tax jurisdictions the information 
would have to be provided separately as well.94 In contrast, according to the European 
Parliament’s proposal, also the data in the CbC report has to be provided separately for each 
jurisdiction, including not only EU member states but also third states. The European 
Parliament considered the limitation of the scope which only requires separate reporting of 
information related to EU Member States and tax havens as inappropriate and recommended 
that multinational corporations should disclose relevant information for all countries 
worldwide in which they operate. 
The proposal adopted by European Parliament allows omitting the disclosure of parts of the 
data where the nature of the information would be seriously prejudicial to an undertaking’s 
commercial position. In such a case, the CbCR must disclose that the reported information is 
not comprehensive.95 Furthermore, it must be explained why the disclosure would be 
seriously prejudicial to the commercial position of the undertaking. According to the proposal 
adopted by the European Parliament, omissions would be subject to prior authorization of the 
national competent authority and would have to be notified to the European Commission. 
This provision was not included in the original Commission’s proposal.  
Even though the discussions about implementing public CbCR in the EU are still ongoing, some 
countries have already started to implement the proposal. The UK and France have already 
adopted provisions dealing with public CbCR domestically. In September 2016, the United 
Kingdom has amended its Finance Bill to give the HR Treasury the power to adopt regulations 
for a public disclosure of CbCR.96 The amendment allows, but does not oblige, the HM Treasury 
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to bring forward regulations to require groups to include a country-by country report in their 
published group tax strategy.  
France adopted public CbCR domestically on 8 November 2016 as a part of its “Loi relative à 
la transparence, à la lutte contre la corruption et à la modernisation de la vie économique” 
(Law on transparency, the fight against corruption and the modernization of the economy).97 
Similarly as the EU proposal for public CbCR, the French provision for public CbCR would have 
required multinationals with a turnover of at least EUR 750 million to publish information 
about the nature of activities, the number of employees, the net sales, the income before tax, 
the income tax due for the current year, the tax paid and the retained earnings. The attempt 
to implement public CbCR in France was however not successful. The French Constitutional 
Court held that public CbCR interferes disproportionally with the freedom of enterprise 
(„liberté d'entreprendre“) and declared public CbCR unconstitutional.98  
Nevertheless, at least in the EU, it seems that tax policy makers are in favour of increasing 
transparency and providing the public with more information on the tax situations of 
multinational entities. Therefore, it would not be surprising if automatic exchange of CbCR 
between tax administrations is just an interim solution and that the global standards are 
further developing towards public CbCR.99 
3. Costs and Benefits from a Taxpayer’s Perspective 
3.1. Harmonization of Documentation Requirements 
In a White Paper on Transfer Pricing Documentation of 2013, the OECD has acknowledged the 
necessity to simplify or streamline transfer pricing documentation requirements because 
more and more countries had started the preparation of transfer pricing documentation.100 
Whereas many countries had introduced specific transfer pricing documentation 
requirements, the nature and detail of the respective domestic provisions varied 
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considerably.101 Different domestic requirements lead to situations where MNE were for 
example often required to comply with two or more sets of transfer pricing documentation 
for one single cross-border controlled transaction.102 Consequently, for taxpayers the new 
guidelines for the local file and the master file could be a positive development in the sense 
that uniform rules on the expectations have been introduced.  
Until BEPS Action 13, the OECD did not provide clear standardized guidance on transfer pricing 
documentation.103 In contrast, the EU TPD has the aim to standardize the documentation that 
MNEs doing business in Europe must provide to tax authorities. The use of the EU TPD – which 
was optional for MNE within the EU – enabled MNEs to use the same documentation in all EU 
Member States.104 The master file concept in the EU TPD had the aim of lowering the 
compliance burden for MNEs by allowing the use of one master file for many jurisdictions.105 
As it is more efficient to use one master file instead of a separate documentation for every 
single jurisdiction, many MNEs have prepared not only an EU master file but also an Asian 
master file, an EMEA master file or an African master file.106 However, due to the lack of 
harmonized transfer pricing documentation guidelines that were accepted by all jurisdictions, 
the transfer pricing documentation, including the master file which provided information 
relevant for a broader geographical area, often had to be adapted to domestic guidelines. 
Therefore, the different entities of a MNE often had to prepare not only their own local file 
but also information on the overall group, which was at best duplicated from a common 
template prepared by the ultimate parent entity. Whereas the EU TPD introduced 
documentation guidelines that lead – at least to a certain extent – to a harmonization of the 
documentation requirements in the EU, the focus of the master file concept under the EU TPD 
was still on a regional level. Furthermore, the EU TPD was an optional concept and numerous 
MNE in the EU had elected not to fully implement the EU TPD guidance, inter alia due to a lack 
of clarity as to its acceptability. Furthermore, taxpayers were concerned about the 
implementation of the EU TPD because it would have increased the scope of information that 
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has to be provided, including all APAs and rulings, and would have led to a wider dissemination 
of European-wide information to all relevant EU tax authorities.107  
The common framework introduced by BEPS Action 13 should address this issue that different 
datasets had to be prepared for different countries. The expectation under the new TP 
guidelines in BEPS Action 13 is that, instead of preparing self-explanatory, self-fully contained 
transfer pricing documentation for every single entity, the task to prepare the master file can 
be assigned to one entity. The master file concept in BEPS Action 13 has the aim to provide a 
common template for those parts of the TP documentation that concern the whole group.108 
Globally standardized guidelines can increase the efficiency for multinationals in preparing the 
TP documentation because common guidelines allow the preparation of one set of 
information that can subsequently be used in all jurisdictions where the MNE operates. This 
standardization lowers the compliance burden for taxpayers as compared to diverging 
domestic requirements in many jurisdictions where the MNE operates. Due to BEPS Action 13, 
the domestic transfer pricing documentation requirements can be expected to become closer 
aligned to each other. Especially for the information included in the master file that concern 
the group as a whole, the requirement to follow different domestic documentation provisions 
in different countries and to provide the information in different languages could cease. Even 
though BEPS Action 13 does not suggest that transfer pricing documentation prepared in 
English should in any case be accepted under the local requirements, “countries are 
encouraged to permit filing of transfer pricing documentation in commonly used languages 
where it will not compromise the usefulness of the documents”.109 
Whether the new master file concept will allow using only one common master file in all 
countries where the MNE operates will however depend on the domestic implementation of 
BEPS Action 13. Other than the CbCR which based on BEPS Action 13 has to be prepared by 
the ultimate parent entity and only be provided to the tax administration in the jurisdiction of 
the ultimate parent, the master file has to be filed locally in every jurisdiction according to the 
domestic requirements.110 Given that there is not much divergence in the domestic 
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implementation of the master file concept, the preparation of TP documentation could 
become more efficient. However, the master file in BEPS Action 13 is not part of the BEPS 
minimum standard but is just a recommendation. There might still be many jurisdictions that 
will either decide not to implement the master file concept at all or to require not only the 
master file according to the BEPS requirements but also additional elements.  
3.2. Compliance Costs 
3.2.1. Master File & Local File  
BEPS Action 13 increases the compliance burden for MNEs by demanding a comprehensive 
transfer pricing documentation consisting of a master file, a local file and a CbCR.111 The 
information required under the local file concept of BEPS Action 13 is in many jurisdictions 
similar to the TP documentation that previously already had to be prepared for the tax 
authorities.112 Where local legislation on transfer pricing documentation was in place, usually 
information on controlled transaction had to be provided.113 Depending on the requirements 
that a MNE had to fulfil previously according to the domestic legislation, the requirements for 
the local file recommended under BEPS Action 13 might however in some aspects extend the 
scope of information to be provided. Especially the information that has to be provided under 
the heading ‘financial information’ which includes inter alia copies of all material 
intercompany agreements and of existing unilateral and bilateral/multilateral APAs and other 
tax rulings in many cases goes beyond of what has been required under previous transfer 
pricing documentation requirements.114  
The effect of the master file concept in BEPS Action 13 on the compliance costs of MNEs will 
depend on the requirements that a MNE had to fulfil previously according to the domestic 
legislation in the countries where it operates. An OECD study revealed that the domestic 
transfer pricing documentation requirements mostly focused on a national perspective and 
only a few countries asked for information on the global business of the MNE group.115 In 
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these countries where information on the overall MNE group was not required or where the 
required scope of such information was limited, the new master file adds another compliance 
layer and increases the compliance costs. For MNEs with well-organized global transfer pricing 
policies, the required information will however usually be relatively easy to compile as it is 
either readily available in existing documentation or is relatively easy to access.116 For MNEs 
where transfer pricing is less organized, the preparation of the new master file may be more 
cumbersome and may require some additional effort to ensure the master file provides more 
understanding than it raises questions.117 However, also in these cases the additional 
compliance burden will mainly affect the first year of reporting when the MNE has to adapt to 
the new requirements. Furthermore, many parts of the master file will not substantially 
change from one year to the next, therefore, additional compliance costs are mainly one-off 
costs.  
BEPS Action 13 requires a broad range of details to be provided which goes beyond what had 
to be included in the master file according to the EU TPD. Compared to the master file that 
has to be provided under the EU TPD, the master file concept in BEPS Action 13 requires the 
reporting of more detailed and of additional information. The master file in BEPS Action 13 is 
generally broader in scope and now includes detailed focus on areas such as intangibles, 
financing and one-off transactions. In addition, the framework is formalistic and requires that 
many lists, e.g. of important agreements, intangibles and transactions, are provided. However, 
not all items have to be mentioned in these lists, as BEPS Action 13 only requires listing of 
important items. This provides some flexibility in respect to the scope of reporting. When 
assessing the importance of listing specific items, BEPS Action 13 requires that the taxpayers 
uses “prudent business judgment in determining the appropriate level of detail for the 
information supplied, keeping in mind the objective of the master file to provide tax 
administrations a high-level overview of the MNE’s global operations and policies. […] 
Information is considered important if its omission would affect the reliability of the transfer 
pricing outcomes.”118 As BEPS Action 13 requires the MNE to decide on the importance of 
specific items, the scope of reporting depends on how the appropriate level of detail is 
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determined. The decision on the appropriate level of detail is not always easy. If the scope is 
broader, the master file will have to be updated more frequently. A narrow scope might 
however raise questions from tax authorities as to why certain transactions are not covered 
in the master file.119  
3.2.2. Country-by-Country Report 
In BEPS Action 13 it is explicitly stated that the taxpayers should not be faced with 
disproportionally high costs and burdens in producing documentation.120 The aim was to draft 
guidelines for transfer pricing documentation that “balance the usefulness of the data to tax 
administrations” with “any increased compliance burdens placed on the taxpayer”.121 
Furthermore, Pascal Saint-Amans, Director of the OECD’s Centre for Tax Policy and 
Administration has testified that the “need to provide certainty and limit the cost of 
compliance to businesses while providing useful instruments to countries is at the core of the 
[OECD’s] work and has been fully taken into consideration”.122  
However, with the CbCR a completely new set of information has to be prepared. This involves 
additional compliance costs for the taxpayers. The costs of implementation are difficult to 
estimate as only limited data is available in this respect. Nevertheless, for illustrative purposes, 
some existing estimations shall be listed here. Both annually recurring costs as well as 
implementation costs in the first year will occur due to CbCR.  
The costs in the first year were for example estimated in a quantitative survey focusing on 
technology, media and entertainment, and telecoms companies study undertaken by EY. 
Among the 51 responses, the cost estimate for complying with BEPS Action 13 in the first year 
was US$ 305,000.123 In contrast, the UK expected only “negligible one-off cost in the first year” 
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for businesses to familiarize themselves with the new requirements, to gather relevant 
information and to provide training to staff.124  
The annual recurring costs of CbCR were calculated by the European Commission when it 
made an impact assessment for public CbCR and provided in this context an estimation for the 
costs that would arise if the CbCR requirement would also be extended to large MNEs 
currently not covered by the requirement to file a CbCR under BEPS Action 13. For those MNEs 
(that are however smaller than the MNEs covered under BEPS Action 13), the European 
Commission estimated the annual costs of CbCR to be on average around EUR 100,000 for one 
large MNE group.125 The Austrian Ministry of Finance has for example estimated the costs of 
implementing CbCR with EUR 200,000 per multinational group that has to report in Austria.126 
In contrast, the German Ministry of Finance estimates the total annual costs of effected MNEs 
with EUR 536,000.127 Estimations of the compliance burden for MNE from different sources 
do not show a uniform picture. 
The required information will usually be available for the MNE, either in existing 
documentation or in relatively easy-to-access information. Resources are however necessary 
to set up or configure the systems to process the required data. Murphy who is one of 
strongest opponents for CbCR has argued that multinationals will already have procedures 
and system in place to allocate data on a geographical basis.128 The different estimations 
above illustrate however that it is generally difficult to estimate the costs of implementation; 
also because the costs depend on different factors, e.g. whether the taxpayer was already 
previously required to report similar information, or which IT system the taxpayer has been 
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using until the implementation of CbCR. There will also be situations where a MNE had recent 
mergers and acquisitions and therefore different entities within the group use different 
accounting systems, e.g. one entity is using SAP, and the other one is using JD Edwards. In 
these circumstances, it is necessary to agree and implement a global system based on a 
common standard.129  
Not only software engineers but also lawyers, advisors, accountants and tax consultants are 
usually involved in the process of setting up, handling and maintaining the new system 
because some of the definitions raise questions. It is for example not always straightforward 
where the headquarter is located and which entities are in or outside the group. One issue 
that is being discussed is for example whether an investment fund could be considered as 
being the ultimate parent entity. An investment fund could literally be covered by the 
definition of an ultimate parent entity. However, if an investment fund is considered as the 
ultimate parent, this could have the consequence that the data of many MNE groups involved 
in a number of different business activities has to be aggregated in one single CbCR. In such a 
situation it is questionable whether the information would still be useful. The OECD has 
published some guidance on whether investment funds may be ultimate parent entities. 
According to these guidelines an investment fund will be the ultimate parent only, if the 
investment fund has to consolidate with investee companies based on the accounting rules 
that govern the investment entity. If the accounting rules do not require consolidation, the 
investee rather than the investment fund should prepare the CbCR, even if the investment 
entity has a controlling interest in the investee company.130 
Similarly, also the secondary reporting obligation has raised some concerns as the CbCR 
requirements do not come into place at the same time in all countries. The timing issue is 
especially relevant for MNEs that have their ultimate parents in a jurisdiction where CbCR is 
only required for 2017 and other entities in jurisdictions that require CbCR already for 2016. 
Such a company structure could result in an obligation to file a CbCR for 2016 by a surrogate 
parent entity. After the CbCR comes in place one year later in the residence state of the 
ultimate parent entity, the person who has to report and the tax authority to which the CbCR 
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has to be provided changes. In general, that should not raise huge issues as all countries should 
use the same general guidance and template that is provided in BEPS Action 13. Double cost 
for the taxpayer can however be the result of such timing differences in adopting the rules if 
local specific guidance and requirements for the CbCR, e.g. on what should or should not be 
included in the revenues, are not exactly the same in all relevant jurisdictions. As a solution 
for this issue the OECD has suggested that countries that do not require CbCR for periods 
commencing from 1 January 2016 may adopt voluntary filing for ultimate parent entities 
resident in their jurisdiction. By voluntarily filing a CbCR in the residence state of the ultimate 
parent entity, the MNE group can avoid having to follow local filing obligations of another 
jurisdiction.131  
The EUR 750 million-threshold has the aim of balancing the reporting burden with the benefit 
of providing additional information about the global allocation of profits within a MNE to the 
tax administrations.132 This threshold excludes businesses with a revenue level that is so low 
that CbCR would be a massive compliance cost as compared to the size of their business. 
Worldwide there are about 10,000 standalone MNEs and 6,500 MNE groups with a turnover 
exceeding EUR 750 million that will be affected by the new requirements to prepare a CbCR.133 
The OECD has estimated that the EUR 750 million-threshold would cover only 10-15% of 
MNEs, these MNEs would however in total represent around 90% of corporate revenues.134 
However, even though the CbCR in BEPS Action 13 provides for the threshold of EUR 750 
million and most countries are implementing the threshold accordingly, if tax administrations 
find the information in the CbCR useful, the threshold could be reduced in the future. Tax 
activist groups like ICRICT and the Tax Justice Network have argued that CbCR does not go far 
enough as it covers only MNEs exceeding the threshold as opposed to all companies.135 The 
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OECD has envisioned that the appropriateness of the revenue threshold will be considered in 
the 2020 review of implementation of the CbCR standard.136 Furthermore, the European 
Commission has considered the consequences of a lower threshold for CbCR in an impact 
assessment for public CbCR.137 Whereas the Commission’s proposal for public CbCR suggests 
to implement the threshold of EUR 750 million, the draft report of the European Parliament 
proposes to adopt a broader scope by using the existing definitions of large groups and large 
undertakings in the Accounting Directive, lowering the necessary turnover threshold to EUR 
40 million.  
One issue that could raise questions for MNEs with revenues close to the EUR 750 million-
threshold is that different countries implement different thresholds based on their own 
currency. Domestic legislation determines the circumstances in which the ultimate parent of 
a MNE or a surrogate parent entity has to file a CbCR. Even though BEPS Action 13 lays down 
a threshold of EUR 750 million, domestic legislation implementing BEPS Action 13 usually 
converts that threshold in the local currency. For example, the obligation for US MNE to file a 
CbCR starts only with an annual revenue of USD 850 million (approx. EUR 800 million) or more. 
In China, the relevant threshold is an annual revenue of RMB 5.5 billion (approx. EUR 751 
million) and in Singapore the threshold is SGD 1.125 billion (approx. EUR 737 million). Due to 
the slightly different thresholds and changes of the exchange rates, circumstances where 
MNEs are within the threshold in one country, but outside the threshold in other countries 
are possible. Where the ultimate parent is not subject to CbCR as it is below the threshold in 
its country of resident, a slightly different threshold in another country could give rise to a 
secondary reporting obligation. The OECD suggests however in its Guidance that those 
different thresholds due to currency fluctuations should not lead to secondary reporting 
requirements.138  
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3.3. Reputational Damages 
3.3.1. Public Country-by-Country Report 
Currently, tax planning structures of multinationals are heavily criticized in the media. There 
is a fear that public CbCR has a negative impact on the reputation of businesses.139 A recent 
survey revealed that 91 % of chief financial officers and tax finance directors across Europe, 
Asia, and the Americas feel that media scrutiny of tax planning activities has a negative impact 
on their company’s reputation.140 Furthermore, 75 % said they were concerned around the 
potential exposure of tax planning information under CbCR and almost a third of respondents 
said that increasing tax scrutiny had made them change their corporate growth strategy in 
specific countries.141  
The media reporting about companies that did not pay enough taxes, dealing with tax planning 
structures of Apple, Starbucks and Google have attracted the interest of the public.142 
Politicians have taken up this issue and have accused multinationals of “immoral” 
behaviour.143 However, in the public debate illegal tax evasion and legal tax planning 
structures are often mixed up and discussed in the same context.144 Multinationals should not 
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only be prevented from tax evasion, but also from legal possibilities to structure their activities 
in order to reduce their overall tax liability.145 This approach has been taken up by the 
European Commission that argued that “there are increasing calls on companies to take 
responsibility for their impact on society and the contribution that businesses make in the form 
of taxation is increasingly seen as part of corporate social responsibility. This has increased 
demand for more transparency in the tax affairs of large enterprises in particular where they 
have significant cross-border activities”.146  
The public’s scepticism about tax affairs of multinationals is high and an entity’s reputation 
may be harmed if it is perceived as not paying its fair share of taxes. If a fast-moving consumer-
goods company gets on the first page of a newspaper as a potential tax cheater, it will 
negatively affect its sales. The increasing attention of the public for the tax affairs of 
multinationals has led to a situation where not only the company’s tax professionals are 
involved in reporting taxes but, instead, also the C-suite executives.147 Increasing transparency 
towards the general public forces MNEs to consider for their tax strategy not only what is 
required and permissible under the applicable tax legislation but instead, to also take into 
account the reputational risk of disclosure of the results of that strategy.148 In order to avoid 
their firm to get to the centre of public attention and the negative impact of media scrutiny 
on their reputation, top executives could become more cautions, value the impact on the 
firm’s reputation higher and thereby put less emphasis on achieving a lower effective tax rate. 
In addition, reporting for tax purposes is increasingly double-checked not only on its 
compliance with the law but also from a PR-perspective on its possible impact on the public 
opinion. As good explanations for the business setup are required, some multinationals might 
reconsider their setup if it gives rise to low taxes being paid or if the CbCR gives the impression 
that the activities are not carried out where the taxes are paid. Increasing the “tax moral” of 
MNE by increasing the public scrutiny is the policy objective of public CbCR. MNEs should 
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respect the spirit and letter of the law, responsibly pay taxes as a part of their corporate 
responsibility and refrain from exploiting existing tax planning opportunities.149 
However, the CbCR only provides very limited information which does not allow assessing 
whether an entity was engaged in tax evasion, aggressive tax planning or whether there are 
good reasons for a lower amount of taxes in a certain year.150 Further information, as it is 
contained in the master file and in the local file, would be required to assess whether a 
multinational can legitimately be accused of aggressive tax planning. However, under the 
proposed requirements public reporting is only required for the CbCR. Because of the concern 
that disclosure of only a limited amount of information could easily lead to misunderstandings 
and in order to stress their image as a ‘good citizen’, some multinationals are moving ahead 
and are voluntarily disclosing more information to the public.151 However, even where a MNE 
goes beyond the legal requirements and discloses more tax information than required by law, 
it is not always received favourably. For example, the CbCR that has been published voluntarily 
by Vodafone has been criticized by tax activists as being “broad-brushed” and 
“meaningless”.152 Even though proactive explanations about items in the CbCR that could raise 
media scrutiny could mitigate the risk of reputational damages, it also involves the risk of 
“waiving a red flag” at issues that would otherwise not have became a major issue.153 
Furthermore, even if more relevant information would be provided, it is questionable whether 
the public would draw the right conclusions from the information. International tax law is 
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complex and the reported figures are not always easy to interpret. Therefore laypersons could 
easily misunderstand or misinterpret the numbers.154 Furthermore, MNEs are concerned that 
the media is mainly looking for stories to sell and will try to find suspicious aspects in the CbCR 
without reflecting whether there could be a valid reason for a certain structure.155 This 
concern is also reflected in the BEPS report which emphasized that complex tax issues have 
sometimes been addressed “in a simplistic manner” by the civil society and NGOs.156 
In addition, if the prevailing aim is to avoid ‘aggressive’ tax planning and to promote that 
multinationals pay ‘their fair share of taxes’, there is a need to make a distinction between 
‘acceptable’ and ‘aggressive’ tax planning. Some argue that even tax planning that is not 
covered by anti-avoidance rules should be condemned where it prevents the states to cover 
necessary expenses. It is however not easy to draw a line where aggressive tax planning starts. 
In this respect, the discussion becomes very emotional. The benchmark is the subjective 
impression of individuals rather than an objective scale which could determine the legality. 
Therefore, the opponents of public CbCR argue that tax payments should only be based on 
legal obligations (taking into account the spirit and letter of the law) and not on a vague 
concept like “fair taxation”.157 
Whereas empirical studies have given some evidence of profit shifting of multinationals,158 
such practices are often in line with the legal requirements. This raises the question whether 
taxes should be a gesture of the goodwill of taxpayers or rather strictly required by law. Paying 
taxes as it is required by law is an obligation; additional contributions to a country’s budget 
beyond the legal obligation could however be considered as a donation. The public scrutiny 
has the power of encouraging a MNE to contribute to a countries budget: After being accused 
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of tax avoidance, Starbucks “voluntarily” paid GBP 20 Mio. to the UK tax authorities. Relying 
on public scrutiny in order to combat tax avoidance rather than trying to fix loopholes in the 
existing legislation might however not be the right path to be followed. As Ting has observed, 
“the “voluntary” tax payments may raise even more concerns about the corporate tax system 
in the eyes of the public. Unlike charitable donation, taxation should not be discretionary. It is 
an insult to the tax system when taxpayers can decide if they want to pay some tax, and if so, 
when and how much to pay.”159  
Furthermore, public scrutiny would not affect all MNEs to the same extent. Whereas well-
known companies that depend on their reputation in the general public could be strongly 
affected by a critical evaluation of their tax situations by the media, this is not true for all 
MNEs. Due to public CbCR well-known consumer goods companies depending on their 
reputation could be more reluctant to report a low tax burden in specific jurisdictions if public 
CbCR is implemented. Furthermore, they could feel the pressure to provide further 
explanation to the information reported in their CbCR where it reveals irregularities. In 
contrast, corporations in the B2B sector might not be as concerned about public CbCR as 
investors and business partners will in many cases be more concerned about the costs of the 
goods and services and the profit that the MNE can achieve than about their business 
partner’s tax payments.160  
Instead of accusing multinationals of being immoral, the politics should focus on improving 
the international tax system to make it less vulnerable to tax avoidance. In many cases 
loopholes that allow MNEs to arrange their structure in order to achieve an overall low 
effective tax rate are well-known but have nonetheless not been closed for many years. On 
the one hand, it is politically difficult to remove a tax regime that is beneficial to businesses. 
On the other hand, jurisdictions decide intentionally to “support” their own MNEs.161 Public 
CbCR has the aim to address harmful tax competition that makes use of loopholes only 
indirectly by offering the media and the general public to name and shame undesired 
behaviour of MNEs without addressing the underlying issues facilitating aggressive tax 
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planning. The main reason for international profit shifting are different tax rates in different 
jurisdictions and the use of separate, national bookkeeping and tax bases that allow profit 
shifting between different jurisdictions. Apple has for example used a relatively simple 
structure to achieve a low overall effective tax rate by exploiting diverging definitions of 
corporate residence in Ireland and the US, in combination with transfer pricing rules on 
intangibles, the controlled foreign corporation regime in the US, the check-the-box regime in 
the US as well as a low-tax jurisdictions.162 An overall low effective tax rate is often the result 
of incentives that are offered by certain jurisdictions intentionally in order to attract 
investments in economically underdeveloped regions.163 Consequently, it is questionable 
whether the private sector should be held responsible for tax competition between different 
jurisdictions.164 
Whereas public CbCR could serve as a deterrent for aggressive tax planning,165 disclosure 
obligation without accompanying substantive changes could result in greater public scrutiny 
and reputational damages for some MNEs, especially for well-known MNEs in the consumer 
goods sector. In contrast, the effect on other MNEs could be minor. Nevertheless, an 
increasing transparency and therefore the visible action against tax planning could however 
have a positive impact on the tax morale of the public. A prevailing impression that certain 
persons do not have to pay taxes or can easily reduce their tax liability to a minimum could 
lead to increasing tax evasion as nobody wants to be the only one who contributes. However, 
as compared to a mere implementation of public CbCR, a combination with substantive 
measures, e.g. the introduction of a common tax base for multinational firms seems to be a 
more effective tool to eliminate potential for international profit shifting.166 
3.3.2. Experience with Public Reporting in Australia 
Even though Australia has not yet implemented public CbCR, it took a leading role in requiring 
public reporting of tax information. Before the introduction of this transparency initiative, 
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similar concerns on possible reputational damages were raised as in the discussion on public 
CbCR that is currently going on. Therefore, the experiences with public reporting of corporate 
tax information in Australia shall briefly be analysed. Since 2013, the Australian Commissioner 
of Taxation publishes the total income, the taxable income, the tax payable and the Australian 
Business Number of all corporate tax entities with a total income of AUD 200 million or more. 
If the corporate tax entity is not an Australian resident private company with 50 % or more 
Australian resident shareholders, the disclosure is already triggered by a total income of 
AUD 100 million or more.167 The Australian provision aims at discouraging large corporate tax 
entities from aggressive tax planning and shall provide information for a public debate on tax 
policy.168  
The public disclosure in Australia – an easily accessible excel file where the data is searchable 
and sortable – revealed that about a 36 % of the entities covered by public disclosure did not 
pay taxes at all.169 The Australian Tax Office (ATO) did however not only publish the bare 
figures but provided some context to the information. The Commissioner of Taxation stated 
that “no tax paid does not necessarily mean tax avoidance”.170 Statistics published along with 
the excel-file revealed for example that out of 36 % of entities not paying taxes 22 % had a 
current year loss, 7 % had a prior year loss and 7 % utilized franking credits and offsets.171 The 
media coverage of the figures was quite moderate, not accusing companies bluntly for tax 
avoidance but taking into account the lack of comprehensive information. Nevertheless, the 
media was critical, published lists of top ‘no-tax’-taxpayers and thereby stressed the large gap 
between the revenues and the taxable base.172 Furthermore, the public disclosure of the tax 
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relevant information has encouraged some entities to publish additional information to 
explain why their tax payable in relation to the total income is lower than the tax rate. In 
Australia, such additional reports explaining the disclosed information have been published 
by Rio Tinto,173 AMP,174 BHP Billiton,175 and Cochlear.176 
The reported data on Australian companies is not only limited, but has also been criticized for 
the possibility of being wrong as the ATO does not make amendments to the published list 
once companies have amended assessments.177 Furthermore, for Australian resident private 
companies with 50 % or more Australian resident shareholders the corporate tax payments 
are imputed onto the Australian resident natural person shareholders and therefore cannot 
give information about the ultimate tax paid.178 Moreover, for companies it is sometimes not 
difficult to avoid disclosure by using a trust instead of a corporate structure or by separating 
a company’s business into multiple non-tax consolidated companies.179 
Even though the Australian experience with publication of corporate taxpayer information can 
give an indication about how the media, NGOs and the MNEs concerned would react to public 
CbCR, there are some differences that have to be borne in mind. First, the manner in which 
the tax data is published is different. Whereas in Australia the ATO publishes one simple Excel 
file containing the tax payments of all relevant companies, public CbCR as proposed in the EU 
would require the MNEs to publish their CbCR with a business register in the EU and online on 
their company website. Accessing a CbCR of one MNE would therefore be quite simple but as 
there is not database containing all public CbCR unlike in Australia – where the data is 
combined in one excel file – it will not be as easy to compare the tax payments of all MNEs 
required to publish such reports. As no common database exists (yet),180 it is unlikely that 
those companies with the lowest overall tax burden will be identified.  
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3.4. An Increasing Number of Disputes 
BEPS Action 13 explicitly states that the CbCR should not be used for transfer pricing 
adjustments based on a global formulary apportionment of income.181 The value of some 
information – especially for applying the arm’s length principle – is however controversial. 
There are some elements of the CbCR where it is not clear how they are relevant under the 
arm’s length standard. CbCR have a strong link to “sales” (revenue), “payroll” (number of 
employees) and “capital” (tangible assets), the TP analysis under BEPS Actions 8 – 10 should 
however focus on the functions performed, assets used, and risks assumed. Whereas the 
assets are to some extent reflected in the CbCR, the link to risk bearing and functions is 
missing.  
The revised OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines still focus on control functions and allow treating 
affiliates that are not controlling the key functions of managing risk or intangibles as adding 
little value, even if they have substantial activities.182 The number of employees is therefore 
of limited use for the TP assessment. For example, having 20 people in Country A, doing 
headquarter senior regional management functions and 500 people in a service centre in 
Country B does not necessarily mean that the key value drivers and consequently the technical 
substance from a transfer pricing perspective is in Country B. Nevertheless, the taxpayers fear 
that the tax administrations of the country were the vast amount of workforce is located could 
use the concise information that has to be provided under the CbC template not just as a risk 
assessment tool but also to adjust profits by applying some form of global apportionment of 
an MNE’s profit.183 Evers and Hundsdoerfer expressed the concern that some tax authorities 
will mainly focus on those entities that have high profits but not so many people without 
conducting a thorough review whether the application of the arm’s length standard is 
                                                     
Multinational Corporations, February 2017, available at http://datafortaxjustice.net/what-do-they-
pay/?utm_content=buffer69698&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer, 
accessed 22 Feb. 2017. 
181 See OECD (2015), Action 13 - 2015 Final Report, p. 16, para. 25; Art. 6 Model CbCR legislation, OECD (2015), 
Action 13 - 2015 Final Report, p. 42; Section 5 (2) MCAA CbCR.  
182 S. Picciotto, International Taxation and Economic Substance, 70 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 12 (2016), p. 755, Journals 
IBFD. 
183 See CFE Fiscal Committee, Comments to the OECD “Discussion Draft on Transfer Pricing Documentation and 
Country-by Country Reporting”, Opinion Statement FC 2/2014 of the CFE, March 2014, p. 14. 
43 
 
reasonable or not.184 A higher number of tax audits as well as more rigorous tax audits are 
expected.185 
Because not all countries have the same tax policy and the same interest the tax authorities 
of different countries might consequently not easily agree on who is allowed to tax which 
parts of a profit. This could lead to more conflicting claims to tax, more cases of double 
taxation and higher effective tax rates even in situations where taxpayers did not act illegally 
or aggressive. A MAP would subsequently often be necessary to avoid double taxation.186  
The increasing transparency as well as the higher number of disputes in the beginning could 
however involve positive aspects in the long run. If not only the number of disputes increases 
but, in addition, arising disputes can be resolved more effectively as envisaged under BEPS 
Action 14,187 there is a potential for increasing certainty in international tax matters. Ideally, 
the increasing transparency should make it easier for the taxpayer to determine which 
different structures are still allowed and what will no longer be accepted by the authorities. 
Where open questions on how to treat specific cross-border business structures are not only 
considered unilaterally by one tax administration but are discussed in the course of a MAP, 
under a bi- or multilateral APA or in a joint audit procedure, the taxpayer would have more 
certainty on what to expect in the future. Where disputes arise, the combination of a MAP 
and an APA in one single negotiation can be of advantage for the taxpayer as it leads not only 
to a solution for the past but also for the future.188 
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3.5. Disclosure of Confidential Information 
3.5.1. Master File 
The information requirements for the master file as stated in BEPS Action 13 are formulated 
rather general. As the information is only provided to the tax authorities and not to the public, 
it does not raise major concerns in respect of confidentiality. For cutting-edge technology 
companies the information requirements in respect to intangibles could however be sensitive. 
The general description of the MNE’s overall strategy for the development, ownership and 
exploitation of intangibles has to include also the location of principal R&D facilities and the 
location of R&D management. Even though the information is basic, in small, highly 
competitive markets the information on where intangibles are developed could already give 
competitors interesting points of reference.  
3.5.2. Country-by Country Report 
The new framework for CbCR requires the reporting and exchange of a greater amount of data 
with an increasing number of tax administrations. This increases also the risk that the 
confidentiality is not preserved and that the data becomes public. BEPS Action 13 requires all 
MNEs whose annual consolidated group revenue equals or exceeds EUR 750 million to prepare 
a CbCR and does not provide for exceptions for certain industries that could be particularly 
sensitive. Even industries where the data in the CbCR will not be necessary for tax purposes 
are included in the reporting framework, e.g. shipping and aviation where usually only the 
state of the place of effective management may tax the profits. Also sovereign wealth funds 
and state-owned enterprises are not excluded from CbCR.  
Under BEPS Action 13 the OECD recommends to ensure “that there is no public disclosure of 
confidential information […] and other commercially sensitive information contained in the 
documentation package (master file, local file and Country-by-Country Report)”.189 Where 
disclosure is necessary, e.g. in public court proceedings, information should only be disclosed 
to the extent needed.190 The OECD explicitly stressed the importance of the confidentiality by 
stating that the local file, the master file and the CbCR shall remain confidential. For automatic 
exchange of CbCR under BEPS Action 13 the OECD requires that participating jurisdictions do 
not only have legal provisions for confidentiality in place but also enforce these provisions 
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effectively in practice.191 This indicates that the information should only be exchanged with 
tax administrations of those jurisdictions that can ensure that the information will be 
protected. Furthermore, in order to ensure the protection of confidential taxpayer data, BEPS 
Action 13 suggests that CbCR shall only be exchanged with jurisdictions which have also 
adopted the standard for information security known as the “ISO/IEC 27000-series” or have 
an equivalent information security framework.192 Furthermore, domestic law must impose 
penalties or sanctions for improper disclosure or use of taxpayer data.193 Therefore, 
confidentiality should not be an issue under CbCR as proposed in BEPS Action 13 because CbCR 
are only exchanged between tax authorities and supposed to not be made available to the 
public. 
Nevertheless, the exchange of information about certain business activities, e.g. dealings with 
the Iran or with North Korea, could have implications beyond a tax-footprint. Consequently, 
for example the US tax authorities have addressed national security concerns in their final 
regulations. Even though the information collected for CbCR is not generally considered as 
posing a national security concern, the US tax authorities indicate that they are willing to 
consider national security implications on a case-by-case basis.194 Similarly, Sim suggests that 
due to their political influence, exceptions could also be granted on a case-by-case basis to 
giant state-owned enterprises as they are prevalent in many Asian countries.195 It is however 
questionable whether such limitations would be in line with BEPS Action 13 because the OECD 
explicitly states that “no exemptions from filing the Country-by-Country Report should be 
adopted [...] no special industry exemptions should be provided, no general exemption for 
investment funds should be provided, and no exemption for non-corporate entities or non-
public corporate entities should be provided”.196 
3.5.3. Public Country-by-Country Report 
The proposal for public CbCR attempts to increase transparency in taxation of multinationals 
without disclosing business-sensitive information. The MNEs which are covered by public 
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CbCR however argue that public CbCR would lead to the disclosure of commercially sensitive 
information.197 This issue has also been addressed by the Commission who addressed the 
possible interference with business secrets in its assessment of the impact of public CbCR. The 
concern is that competitors and business partners could get insight in essential business 
figures.198 Especially where PEs or subsidiaries are set up in another country only for one 
project, e.g. for a construction, the figures in the CbCR basically represent the numbers of the 
construction side. Hence, the CbCR would allow conclusions about the profitability or other 
key indicators regarding this one project as industrial insiders usually know that there is just 
one project in this country. This could be a disadvantage for further negotiations with 
customers and could put a burden on the existing project as the customer might feel screwed 
if the profitability of another project, for whatever reason, would be lower. Even if there is a 
good reason for the difference in profitability, the CbCR could put a pressure on the company.  
Within the EU, banks and investment funds are obliged to prepare a CbCR and to publish it 
together with their annual report.199 In this CbCR, the name and nature of activities 
undertaken by an entity, their turnover, number of full time employees, profit or loss before 
tax, tax on profit or loss, and any public subsidies received has to be provided aggregated by 
country and by institution. However, in order to assess the possible negative consequences of 
publishing this information, until 2014 country-specific data on profits/losses and tax 
payments had to be reported only confidentially to the Commission. On the basis of this 
confidential CbCR, the Commission evaluated the impact of requiring MNEs to publish CbCR 
in October 2014.200 On the basis of a study201 and several consultations with stakeholders the 
Commission concluded that public CbCR according to the EU CRD IV “is not expected to have 
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significant negative economic impact, in particular on competitiveness, investment, credit 
availability or the stability of the financial system”. In its assessment, the Commission inter 
alia did not consider the information that is disclosed under CbCR as commercially confidential 
as it is “not sufficient for interested parties to get a detailed understanding of the commercial 
strategies of the reporting institutions”.202 Therefore, the Commission did not see any reason 
for making use of its possibility to further defer the publishing of CbCR for banking groups. 
This assessment concerns however only the obligation to publish a (more limited) CbCR for 
the financial sector and did not deal with the consequences that public CbCR might have for 
MNEs in other sectors. 
In contrast, in France, where provisions dealing with public CbCR had already been adopted 
domestically, the Constitutional Court acknowledged the negative implications that public 
CbCR could have. The French Constitutional Court has therefore held that public CbCR would 
require MNEs to provide too much information to the public and declared the provision for 
public CbCR unconstitutional.203 The court stated that public CbCR would require MNEs to 
reveal essential parts of their business strategy to the public.204 Whereas the French 
Constitutional Court acknowledged the legitimacy of the aim to fight fraud and tax evasion,205 
it nevertheless held that public CbCR is a non-proportionate interference with the freedom of 
enterprise.206 
The proposal adopted by European Parliament, however, allows omitting the disclosure of 
parts of the data where the nature of the information would be seriously prejudicial to an 
undertaking’s commercial position. As an example where this limitation could apply, the 
proposal mentions the situation “when only a single affiliated undertaking operates in a tax 
jurisdiction which is not listed in the EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax 
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purposes”.207 The exception from the reporting obligation could contribute to overcoming the 
concerns in respect to confidentiality and seems to be a response to the decision of the French 
Constitutional Court.  
4. Costs and Benefits from a Government's Perspective  
4.1. Availability of Additional Data  
4.1.1. Master File 
The master file should provide an auditor with a clear overview of the global footprint of an 
entire group and thereby help the tax administration to understand the business and to 
evaluate transfer pricing risks. BEPS Action 13 aims at a consistent implementation of the 
same or similar documentation requirements in all countries.208 The clear and structured 
requirements aim to contribute towards an efficient use of the data by the tax authorities. 
The obligation to provide many lists, e.g. of important intra-group service agreements, of 
intangibles, of important intra-group agreements related to intangibles and of the MNE 
group’s tax rulings, instead of merely requiring general descriptions that is imposed on MNEs 
provides the tax administrations with better structured and consequently easily to assess 
information.  
Furthermore, for the cross-border cooperation between tax administrations of different 
jurisdictions, the common template for the master file has the effect that it is easier for tax 
authorities of different jurisdictions to work together because the TP documentation that is 
provided by different entities within the same group to the tax authorities contains the same 
master file. A common “big picture” view of the MNE group’s transfer pricing practices and its 
results instead of separate domestic transfer pricing documentation requirements focusing 
merely on the domestic tax treatment of the cross-border controlled transactions facilitates 
the cooperation between tax administration.209 Having an equivalent level of information in 
the beginning of transfer pricing discussions, e.g. on a MAP or an APA, increases the efficiency 
and could reduce the length of negotiations.  
                                                     
207 Art. 48c (3a) of the Proposal to change the Accounting Directive. 
208 OECD (2015), Action 13 - 2015 Final Report, p. 11; OECD, White Paper on Transfer Pricing Documentation, 30 
July 2013, p. 12, available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/white-paper-transfer-pricing-
documentation.pdf. 
209 OECD, White Paper on Transfer Pricing Documentation, 30 July 2013, p. 12, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/white-paper-transfer-pricing-documentation.pdf. 
49 
 
As regards the focus on intangibles and intercompany financial activities in the master file 
concept under BEPS Action 13, it has already been pointed out earlier that this additional 
information (as compared to the EU TPD) is relevant for other proposals in the BEPS project. 
For intangibles, the additional information about the overall strategy for the development, 
ownership and exploitation is relevant because the allocation of profits from intangibles 
should no longer be limited to merely determining the legal ownership of intangibles but, 
instead, follow the analysis of functions related to the development, maintenance, 
enhancement, protection and exploitation of the intangibles. 
4.1.2. Country-by-Country Report 
The data included in CbCR should give the tax authorities an indication about where the 
economic activities of a MNE take place and thereby provide the tax administrations with a 
valuable tool for assessing the transfer pricing risks. The CbCR should help tax authorities to 
detect significant instances of distortive transfer pricing and other base eroding practices.210 
Ting has assessed CbCR as being “a critical ingredient in assisting tax authorities to focus their 
limited resources on the right targets”.211 
Some information that is included in the CbCR might already be partly assessable for the tax 
authorities, e.g. due to the disclosure requirements for annual accounts of capital 
companies.212 However, the consolidated statements do not provide segregation per country 
and the statements prepared in accordance with local accounting principles are not easy to 
collect for the tax administrations as financial accounts do not have to be published in all 
countries. Under the CbCR concept in BEPS Action 13, information has to be reported for each 
jurisdiction and the CbCR will therefore provide also information about economic activities in 
countries where companies are not required to publish financial accounts.213 In addition, the 
requirement to report a standardized set of data should make it easier for tax authorities to 
evaluate the information. Even where the information is already available to the tax 
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administration outside the CbCR, the tax administration cannot access the data in the 
concentrated and systematic way as it should be possible due to CbCR.  
The tax administrations could use the data exchanged under CbCR for a screening on an 
automatic basis to identify high-risk cases which are subsequently audited.214 The tax 
authorities could calculate the profit margins of MNEs in the different jurisdictions and 
compare it either with the margin in all other countries or with the margin in countries where 
the MNE is exercising the same main business activity. If the margin is considerably lower, it 
could start a detailed audit. Another possibility to use the data of the CbCR would be to 
calculate the profit/loss per employee and compare it with the figures in other jurisdictions.215 
CbCR could therefore make the risk reviews of tax administrations more systematic and 
efficient. It has been anticipated that this could make it on the overall cheaper to collect 
additional taxes.216 CbCR could serve as a tool to identify high-risk cases and are therefore 
useful for tax authorities to decide whether audits should be conducted.217 
Whereas the main purpose of the CbCR is to identify cases of base erosion for audits, the CbCR 
could also direct the course of the audit. As BEPS Action 13 acknowledges, the CbCR together 
with the master file and the local file can “provide information to commence and target audit 
enquiries”.218 The CbCR can provide the tax administrations with a starting point to quickly 
review where a MNE is present and allows assessing at first glance where the MNE has low 
economic substance but still considerable profits.219 This information could subsequently be 
used e.g. to specifically examine intra-company agreements with entities it those countries.  
The comparability of CbCR of different MNEs as well as the usefulness of the data to tax 
administrations is however unclear. The data included in the CbCR is not particularly 
remarkable as it is rather simple. Only aggregated data per country has to be reported, even 
if a multinational group is operating different business units or if a MNE has different entities 
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in one jurisdiction. If a group has for example five different entities in one jurisdiction, it has 
to state the main business activities of each entity but the number of employees, the profit 
and the turnover has to be provided only on an aggregated basis for the whole country. 
Furthermore, no reconciliation with the consolidated financial statements is required and 
BEPS Action 13 allows for flexibility in respect to the source of the data. BEPS Action 13 allows 
the MNE to choose whether to use data from their consolidation reporting packages, from 
separate entity statutory financial statements, regulatory financial statements, or internal 
management accounts. Depending on the data source, the CbCR may however show a 
different picture of the MNE’s tax structure. Consequently, CbCR of different MNEs are of only 
limited comparability.220 Evers, Meier and Spengel consider neither consolidated nor 
individual financial accounts as appropriate to provide country-specific information.221  
Furthermore, CbCR follows the concept of formulary apportionment which has been proposed 
as an alternative to separate tax accounting. For auditing whether MNEs have correctly 
applied the arm’s length principle, the CbCR might however be of limited use. Hines has 
demonstrated in a study on European company accounts that employment, property and 
sales explains less than 22 percent of the variation in profits between firms.222 A company’s 
profits are also influenced by a number of other factors, including the infrastructure, the 
environment and managerial inputs.223 Furthermore, to some extent the economic activity of 
a MNE cannot reasonably be located. Examples are the profits of mobile intangibles as well as 
of the economies of integration. The profit of an integrated group is usually higher than the 
aggregate profit that would have been earned by the single members of the group. The 
allocation of such profit generated on a group level through the economies of integration will 
always be to a certain extent arbitrary.224 
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As the CbCR allows only rather simple analysis, it can be expected that tax authorities in some 
countries will focus their attention on high profits in countries with low tax rates and little 
presence. However, where MNEs are not acting illegal but are exploiting gaps and loopholes 
in domestic and international tax law, the combination of low economic substance and high 
profits alone should not lead to TP adjustments. The OECD stresses in BEPS Action 13 that the 
data in the CbCR does not constitute conclusive evidence and that TP adjustments shall not 
be based on the CbCR. Such structures could be covered by specific or general anti-avoidance 
provisions; in general, the taxpayer is however not prevented from structuring his business in 
a way to achieve a low overall level of taxation.225 Even though especially NGOs often criticize 
such behaviour as ‘not acceptable’, tax administrations cannot rely on CbCR to fight against 
this behaviour. 
The data in the CbCR allows the tax authorities an assessment of the MNEs as one economic 
unit and the global allocation of its functions, assets and profits. The substantial tax laws 
however follow a different approach. Related entities are treated as separate taxpayers and 
transactions between associated entities have to be assessed according to the ‘arm’s length 
principle’. Under this principle, profits deriving from transactions between associated 
enterprises should be in line with the profits, which would have occurred if the enterprises 
were not associated (i.e., if they were ‘independent enterprises’). Therefore, BEPS Action 13 
stresses that a CbCR cannot be itself the basis of tax assessments on a “formulary” basis.  
Nevertheless, even though the information might be of limited use for a comprehensive TP 
assessment, the CbCR can be useful for tax authorities because all tax authorities concerned 
with a specific transaction will have access to the same basic set of information. This could 
help the tax administrations to identify the specific jurisdictions and specific provisions which 
provide tax planning opportunities. These jurisdictions and/or provisions could subsequently 
be targeted by a closer examination of the transfer price and the method used.  
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4.2. Increasing (Voluntary Over-) Compliance 
4.2.1. Country-by-Country Report 
The most fundamental change due to the new reporting requirements under the CbCR will be 
the impact that the obligation to provide CbCR will have on the taxpayer. It is the first time 
that taxpayers are required to disclose information on the global allocation of their profits in 
a systematic manner. In this respect, CbCR could have a deterrent effect. The taxpayers will 
not only set up the template but will also strategically review how the information will be 
perceived by the tax authorities. If a MNE knows about the obligation to disclose a CbCR to 
the tax authorities “it may have less incentive to undertake aggressive BEPS”.226 It can be 
expected that those positions which cannot be defended or which would be difficult and costly 
to defend will already be restructured before the first CbCR is provided to the tax authorities. 
MNEs might avoid disclosing proportionally low effective tax contributions in certain 
jurisdictions as they can reasonably expect that disclosing a CbCR that indicates aggressive tax 
planning triggers tax investigations and audits.227 
However, a consultation by the European Commission collecting views from more than 400 
respondents representing business, industry associations, NGOs, citizens and think tanks, 
revealed that the business sector is not expecting significant changes in their business 
structures as a result of more transparency towards tax authorities, stating that the businesses 
are already complying with national laws. In contrast, more than half of the individuals 
responding to the survey believe that greater transparency towards the authorities would 
increase tax compliance by firms and reduce the exploitation of tax gaps, mismatches and 
loopholes designed to minimize tax payments.228 Nevertheless, some MNEs might revaluate 
their tax behaviour not because the previous structure was illegal but in order to address the 
increasing attention for the tax situation of multinational entities by the general public and 
the media. In addition to the company’s tax professionals the top-level management of MNEs 
might play a stricter role and could consider the tax liability of the group not only as a cost 
factor of the business anymore but also a factor that can influence the reputation of a MNE.  
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4.2.2. Public Country-by-Country Report 
Whereas already CbCR according to BEPS 13 could have a deterrent effect to tax planning, 
such an effect is likely to be more powerful for public CbCR.229 One argument for public CbCR 
is that it is an effective instrument to fight against tax avoidance. In the preamble to the 
proposed amendment of the Accounting Directive, it is stated that “public scrutiny can help to 
ensure that profits are effectively taxed where they are generated“.230 CbCR provides the civil 
society with an overview over the amount of taxes that multinational entities pay in every 
jurisdiction. The non-profit organizations lobbying for the implementation of CbCR argue that 
this information could allow an assessment on whether the MNE as a whole has paid enough 
taxes and which countries mainly benefited from the taxes paid. Especially MNEs in the B2C 
sector could be subject to the pressure of their customers to pay “a fair amount of taxes”.231 
The fact that the information has to be published could prevent multinationals to engage in 
tax planning schemes that would result in a low effective tax rate as it could have a negative 
impact on its reputation and consequently also on its sales if the CbCR shows that a MNE did 
not pay a lot of taxes.232  
Public scrutiny could be an effective tool to increase the effective tax rate of multinationals. 
Previous research revealed that individual top executives play a significant role in determining 
a firm’s level of tax avoidance.233 The executives’ effect on the level of effective tax rate is 
however not due to their direct involvement in tax avoidance but more likely due to the “tone 
at the top”.234 A recent survey revealed that 75 % of chief financial officers and tax finance 
directors were concerned about the potential exposure of tax planning information under 
CbCR.235 In order to avoid their firm to get to the centre of public attention and the negative 
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impact of media scrutiny on their reputation, top executives could become more cautions, 
value the impact on the firm’s reputation higher and thereby put less emphasis on achieving 
a lower effective tax rate. Such a change in the “tone at the top” can subsequently be expected 
to have an impact on the multinational’s effective tax rate.  
Dyreng, Hoopes and Wilde showed that public pressure may directly affect a company’s tax 
strategy.236 They compared the tax receipts of certain firms that have been investigated by 
ActionAid International before and after it was revealed that the firms were not complying 
with rules requiring the disclose of the location of subsidiaries. The scrutinized firm’s tax 
expenses increased which led the authors to the conclusion that “public pressure related to 
subsidiary disclosure can impose significant political and reputational costs on and affect the 
tax avoidance activities and subsidiary location decisions of large, publicly traded firms“.237 
However, the effect of public scrutiny might be dependent on the risk that a multinational is 
prepared to take. Public pressure has more impact on risk-averse businesses that are more 
concerned about their reputation, e.g. because they are publically well-known enterprises and 
are consumer-facing businesses.238 The results of a study of Austin and Wilson show that firms 
with valuable consumer brands report higher effective tax rates and are less likely to report 
effective tax rates below salient cut-off points (30, 25, 20 and 10 percent).239  
A similar result is possible under public CbCR. Especially well-known companies could be 
reluctant to report very low tax burden in specific jurisdictions or would be forced to provide 
an explanation for their CbCR. In contrast, corporations in the B2B sector might not be as 
dependent on their reputation in the general public and therefore less concerned about 
publishing a public CbCR that indicates a low overall effective tax burden. Investors and 
business partners will in many cases be more concerned about the costs of the goods and 
services and the profit that the MNE can achieve than about their business partner’s tax 
payments.240  
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4.3. Fairer Tax Landscape 
Avi-Yonah and Xu argue that the domestic legislatures and tax authorities will be more diligent 
and competent in tackling the BEPS issues under public scrutiny and support.241 Furthermore, 
the ICRICT has suggested that public CbCR would provide data for public evaluation of the 
effectiveness of BEPS.242 Many loopholes in international tax law have not been closed 
because governments have an interest in protecting the competitiveness of their tax 
system.243 The public interest in how multinationals are taxed does not only stem from the 
desire of the public to control tax assessments and to make sure that every company pays the 
right amount of taxes. When public CbCR was first proposed, the primary goal was not to 
ensure that multinationals pay enough taxes. Instead, the campaign ‘Publish What You Pay’, 
a coalition of civil society organizations, was an anti-corruption measure that should prevent 
politicians to use the wealth from the extractive industries in their private interest. Therefore, 
the ‘Publish What You Pay’ campaign focused on introducing a framework which would allow 
citizens of resource-rich countries to hold their governments accountable for the 
management of revenues from the extractive industries.244 Entities in the extractives sector 
should be required to disclose the payments that they made in each country and additional 
information in order to make it possible to assess the scale of the entity’s operations in their 
financial reports. This information should provide the public with information on the 
contribution of the entity to the government’s budget. The increasing transparency was aimed 
at guaranteeing the government's accountability for public expenditure. In a similar manner, 
public CbCR could provide the civil society an instrument to assess the effects of a country’s 
tax system. In this respect, public scrutiny could not only directly affect the MNEs but also tax 
policymakers.  
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In addition, NGOs and the civil society have the perception that tax authorities in numerous 
countries make unfair secret tax deals with large companies.245 Some argue that even where 
the tax rulings as such do not become public, the figures published in CbCR could reveal such 
practices and act as a deterrent for tax authorities to provide beneficial rulings. Irrespective 
of whether the public disclosure would have an effect on the practices of tax administrations 
or not, public CbCR could increase the trust of the civil society in tax administrations and also 
in tax policy. Furthermore, public CbCR could also give the public more information about the 
effect of tax laws not only for individual and SME taxpayers but also on MNE. The European 
Commission argues that public CbCR should “promote a better informed debate on potential 
shortcomings in tax laws”.246 
4.4. Decreasing Competitiveness of the Tax System 
If transparency is not increased at the same level in all relevant jurisdictions, the first-movers 
may face a negative impact on the competitiveness of their tax system. The possible negative 
impact depends however on the design of the specific provision.  
If public CbCR is introduced in a certain country or in a certain geographical region it could 
either only be applicable to MNEs headquartered in that jurisdiction or also cover MNEs that 
have their headquarter outside the jurisdiction(s) covered by public CbCR. Where MNEs do 
not have their headquarter – but only subsidiaries or PEs – in the relevant jurisdiction(s) and 
these MNEs would not be covered by public CbCR, this could lead to a distortion of the level-
playing field.247 
Furthermore, the data that has to be published matters. Public CbCR as proposed by the 
Commission would include the relevant figures separately for each EU Member State and on 
an aggregated basis for other tax jurisdictions. Only for certain jurisdictions listed in a common 
EU list of non-compliant tax jurisdictions the information has to be provided separately as 
well.248 This draft has been criticized for putting EU multinationals at a comparative 
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disadvantage. Christian Kaeser, Global Head of Tax at Siemens and Chairman of the ICC 
Commission on Taxation, responded to the Commmission’s proposal for public CbCR by 
pointing out that public CbCR as it was proposed “risks exposing commercially sensitive 
information that would place companies operating within the EU at a competitive 
disadvantage for global investment, without any additional benefit to public finances”.249 The 
suggested amendment would require detailed information about the allocation of profits 
within the EU, but besides for tax havens only aggregate data for third countries. Therefore, 
public CbCR as it is suggested within the EU will reveal the use of favourable tax regimes within 
the EU, e.g. Luxembourg, Ireland and the Netherlands, but will not provide detailed 
information on the allocation of profits outside the EU. This can create an incentive to use 
non-EU jurisdictions with favourable tax regimes instead of EU ones and could thereby 
jeopardize the EU's competitiveness. This argument does however not apply to the concept 
of public CbCR in general but is owed to the special characteristics of the EU proposal which 
does not cover activities outside the EU in the same way as activities within the EU. 
5. Conclusion 
The objectives of the BEPS project are summarized in the G20 Leader’s Declaration of the St. 
Petersburg Summit in September 2013: “Profits should be taxed where economic activities 
deriving the profits are performed and where value is created. In order to minimize BEPS, we 
call on member countries to examine how our own domestic laws contribute to BEPS and to 
ensure that international and our own tax rules do not allow or encourage multinational 
enterprises to reduce overall taxes paid by artificially shifting profits to low-tax jurisdictions. 
We acknowledge that effective taxation of mobile income is one of the key challenges.”250 The 
transparency initiatives in BEPS Action 13 that are discussed in this contribution should 
contribute to this policy goal. The arm’s length principle allows MNEs to design their group 
structure, to set up intra-group contracts and to thereby allocate functions, assets, and risks 
within the MNE.251 The additional information that has to be reported due to BEPS Action 13 
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aims at providing the tax authorities with a better understanding of the implications of the 
MNE’s set-up on the overall tax outcome. Increasing transparency should decrease the 
information asymmetry between MNEs, tax authorities and to a certain extent also the 
general public. Especially in Europe one can witness a movement towards increasing 
transparency of corporate tax data to the public. Whereas automatic exchange of CbCR is still 
in the process of being implemented, a proposal for public CbCR is already under discussion.  
Three main benefits of increasing transparency can be identified from a government’s 
perspective. Firstly, more information on the taxpayers supports the tax authorities in 
efficiently identifying specific taxpayers and structures where tax has been avoided or evaded. 
Compared to the requirements in the EU TPD, the master file and the local file under BEPS 
Action 13 require more structured data and put a focus on intangibles and intercompany 
financing. Taking into account the changes to the TP guidelines in BEPS Actions 8-10, the 
information in the master file and in the local file will be necessary for the TP assessment. 
Even though many lists have to be prepared, some flexibility is left to the taxpayers as detailed 
information has to be provided only for material transactions. Whereas the value of local files 
and the master file is clear, CbCR is controversially discussed. The proponents praise the CbCR 
as an instrument which will improve the efficiency of audits as it allows the tax authorities a 
broad risk assessment by identifying where the MNE has low economic substance but still 
considerable profits. In contrast, opponents question whether the information in the CbCR 
will be appropriately used. The value of CbCR for TP assessments according to the arm’s length 
principle beyond this broad risk assessment is doubtful because the reportable data follows 
the concept of formulary apportionment.252 
Secondly, the increasing transparency could have a positive impact on the tax landscape as a 
whole. CbCR could assist the governments to identify those structures that are frequently 
being used for tax planning of MNEs and result in a low effective tax rate. The additional data 
from increased transparency in international taxation can serve as a starting point for changes 
in the tax legislations that specifically target those practices of MNE. Furthermore, public CbCR 
is a visible action against tax avoidance practices and could also stimulate the discussion about 
the ‘fairness’ of international tax practices. Under public CbCR, the expected public scrutiny 
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could have a positive impact on the efforts of the government and the tax administration to 
tackle tax evasion and tax avoidance. 
Thirdly, the increasing reporting requirements are expected to not only serve as a tool for tax 
administrations and tax legislators to combat tax avoidance and tax evasion but are expected 
to be measures that act as a deterrent to aggressive tax planning. Instead of reporting 
information that could trigger special attention by the tax authorities, MNE’s are likely to 
adapt their tax strategy and opt for a less aggressive tax planning structure as “the potential 
tax benefit may be outweighed by the increased risk of tax investigations and audits”.253 The 
deterrent effect to tax planning is likely to be even more powerful for public CbCR.  
From the perspective of the taxpayer, BEPS Action 13 could have the benefit of a 
harmonization of reporting requirements. On the long run, the master file concept in BEPS 
Action 13 will be an advantage for the taxpayers as a uniform set of rules for documentation 
requirements has been introduced. If there is not much divergence in the domestic 
implementation of the master file concept, one common master file could be used in all 
countries where the MNE operates and consequently, the preparation of TP documentation 
could become more efficient. Due to the new reporting requirements, the taxpayers are 
however also faced with some challenges. Four main issues can be identified. 
First, under BEPS Action 13, the new transfer pricing documentation requirements have 
considerably extended the amount of information that has to be provided by the taxpayers to 
the tax administrations. Both additional and more detailed documentation is required which 
increases the administrative burden for the taxpayer. Especially the CbCR is at the centre of 
attention as it goes clearly beyond of what has previously been required under appropriate 
TP documentation. Whether the requirements stemming from BEPS Action 13 will significantly 
increase the compliance burden for the MNEs will depend on where the MNE is doing business 
and on the documentation requirements that the MNE had to fulfil prior to the 
implementation of the BEPS Action 13 package. 
Secondly, public CbCR could have a negative impact on the reputation of a MNE. The public 
scrutiny could lead to a higher effective tax rate of well-known, consumer-facing companies 
as these companies will be concerned about their reputation. In contrast, it is doubtful, 
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whether public CbCR can also have a significant impact on those companies that are not well-
known to the public and therefore would not have to fear negative consequences to the same 
extent. However, it has to be kept in mind that tax incentives are often offered by certain 
jurisdictions intentionally in order to attract investments in economically underdeveloped 
regions. Tax competition between different jurisdictions, different tax rates combined with 
the use of separate, national bookkeeping and tax bases enable tax planning and a lower 
overall effective tax rate. Public CbCR may put MNEs under public scrutiny if the global 
allocation shows that the tax payment in certain jurisdictions was rather low. The reputational 
risk may force MNEs to distinguish between behaviour that is ‘acceptable’ and ‘aggressive’ tax 
planning. 
Thirdly, CbCR could lead to an increasing number of disputes. The value of some information 
– especially for applying the arm’s length principle – is controversial. The OECD addressed the 
concern that tax authorities could use CbCR to apply some elements of formulary 
apportionment in their tax assessments by explicitly stating that the CbCR should not be used 
for transfer pricing adjustments based on a global formulary apportionment of income.254 
Nevertheless, taxpayers expect a higher number as well as more rigorous tax audits and more 
disputes on which jurisdiction is allowed to tax which parts of a profit.  
Fourthly, increasing transparency could lead to a disclosure of commercially sensitive 
information. Whereas under BEPS Action 13 the information contained in a CbCR has to 
remain strictly confidential and can only be disclosed to the tax authorities, public CbCR is 
currently also discussed. A public disclosure of CbCR is however disputed. Because of the 
concern that public CbCR would require MNEs to reveal essential parts of their business 
strategy to the public, the French Constitutional Court has declared public CbCR 
unconstitutional.255  
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